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LOW ELECTRICITY RATES FOR NON-FERROUS METALS INDUSTRY

Paris LES ECHOS in French 6 Jul 83 p 6

[Article by A. V.]

[Text] "It is indeed our intention to enable our industries to take advantage of all savings offered by construction of nuclear power plants," recalled M Jean Auroux, yesterday's guest speaker before the plenary meeting of the Federation of Mineral and Non-ferrous Metals Trade Associations. Recapitulating the views of Jean Pierre Chevenement, the energy minister intimated that the particular electricity rates policy applied to PUK [expansion unknown]--which he did not mention by name--could be broadened to other large consuming sectors in basic industries. The minister also emphasized that public authorities were sparing no efforts to develop that policy and to support the non-ferrous sector.

For his part the federation's president, M Poincare, chose to bring up three present-day problems. European industrialists wish to defend themselves more effectively against unfair trade practices by third countries. Thus he asked public authorities to back the request made to the crude aluminum base price commission. The aim of European industrialists is to set a base price, and to obtain automatic triggering of an anti-dumping procedure in the event of deliveries below that price.

Another preoccupation is the need to adapt industrial structures. That is the zinc producers are attempting to do in concert, with the present objective of obtaining the closing down of some 800 to 100,000 tons [as published] of capacity, rather than 200,000 as was planned last year. The third question raised by M Poincare was that of raw materials supply. In that context he deplored the cut in resources originally allocated by public authorities to the metals plan for 1983, which aims to develop means for better assuring the nation's raw materials supply.

The president also stressed "the imperative need to maintain or reintroduce scrap export quotas. In the fall, Brussels is to take a position for 1984. But the question is worrisome, especially for aluminum. Exports swelled from 5,000 tons in 1980 to 20,000 in 1982 since quotas were lifted three

years ago. The year 1983 started out with a rate of 25,000 tons, and the EEC has not reacted, though the alarm threshold (twice the 1980 quota, or 5,600 tons) has been exceeded by far.

The Japanese, who are specialists in second-fusion aluminum and who see the American scrap market closing, are "pillaging" Europe and beginning to cause supply problems for EEC refiners.

6145

CSO: 3519/571

POSSIBILITY OF EXPORTING MORE NATURAL GAS SEEN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
28 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] Sales policies for Dutch natural gas can be expanded considerably in the future. This is possible because energy consumption has decreased in the Netherlands itself and in neighboring countries and, at the same time, demand for natural gas has, relatively speaking, improved. Besides, natural gas reserves are expected to last longer than originally expected. According to statements by G Kardaun, general manager of the N V Nederlandse Gasunie (Groningen), the decrease in sales of natural gas that had begun in 1979 now has stopped. In the first six months of this year, Gasunie sold 2.1 percent more natural gas than during the corresponding months in 1982. In spite of the mild winter sales increased even in the country itself. In comparison with the first half of 1982, sales in the country rose by 6.5 percent to slightly above 21 billion cubic meters primarily because of the increased use of natural gas in electric power plants. The export of natural gas fell by 1.9 percent to about 21 billion cubic meters. Kardaun made these statements at the time when the gas sales plans for 1983 were published which describe the prospects for the coming 25 years.

These plans are based on the assumption that in the coming years the actual price for crude oil will stabilize at around \$30 per barrel and then rise to \$40 per barrel in the nineties. In addition, zero increase in the gross national product is expected from the Netherlands from now until 1986, and afterwards an average increase annually of 1.5 percent until the year 2000. Industrial production after 1985 is expected to increase by 2.5 percent on the average per year. Finally, it is expected that in almost all fields of consumption energy will be saved and used more efficiently. For industry, a reduction of energy consumption by approximately 30 percent is predicted for the years from 1980 to 2000, and the same is true for domestic consumption. With a moderate rate of economic growth, energy consumption will therefore remain nearly unchanged. There will be some variations because of the differences in consumption by individual energy consumers. Between the years 1980 and 2000, crude oil consumption will decrease from 43 to 35 percent. The use of coal will increase to 20 percent, and natural gas will then still provide 20 percent of the energy supply.

In this scenario, a total of 1,340 billion cubic meters of natural gas will be required for the next 25 years (1983 to 2007). For domestic consumption sales are estimated to amount to 900 billion cubic meters, i.e. an annual average of 36 billion cubic meters, 60 percent of which will go to centers of industry and electric power production.

For the export of natural gas, Gasunie will need a total of 440 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the next 25 years, a little more than the amount predicted in previous gas sales plans. The reason for the difference is that gas exports were lower in the past few years than had originally been estimated. In the past year, e.g., 35 billion cubic meters were exported, that is approximately 20 percent below the amount exported in 1979. Because the amounts to be exported are agreed upon in contracts and cannot be changed and because export contracts are flexible, more natural gas is going to be exported in the coming years. Until the middle of the nineties, exports will remain comparatively stable with an annual amount of between 30 and 35 billion cubic meters and will not decrease until the end of the century as Gasunie had previously predicted. This also means that natural gas revenues for the Dutch government will no longer decrease.

Gasunie is now of the opinion that an increase in natural gas exports will be possible during the nineties. This policy falls in line with that of the Dutch government which will make a statement on this subject in the fall of this year. S A Rissik, the commercial manager of Gasunie, thinks however that the possibility of export increases is not especially good because of today's oversupply of natural gas on the West European market.

He believes that export possibilities would improve only during the nineties and that then would be the time to recommend export increases in order to halt the too rapid export decreases based on current supply contracts, and thereby also to halt the decreases of state revenues. Gasunie thinks, however, that in that case caution is still advised in making new export contracts. Sales increases must have room for great flexibility so that there will be no obstacles for long-range Dutch natural gas supplies if domestic demands for natural gas should be higher than assumed today. Faith in energy saving measures must not be undermined. Even though budgetary considerations are very important, the assurance of natural gas supplies is still of primary importance. Gasunie did not want to say exactly how much room there is for the expansion of natural gas exports.

Hardly any possibilities are seen for the increase in sales on the domestic market. There are additional, even though limited, possibilities to increase sales to electric power plants. Another possibility might be the increase of natural gas consumption in industry after current limitations are made less stringent. But here, too, only moderate success can be expected.

In regard to the supply of natural gas, Gasunie states in its sales plan that proven reserves (as of 1 January 1983) amount to a total of 1,530 billion cubic meters of which 1,490 billion cubic meters are under Dutch soil and in the Dutch part of the mainland. 40 billion cubic meters are assured by import contracts from Norway. The fact that the reserves are "proven" means that there is only a 10 percent chance that the estimates are too high. The proven reserves at the beginning of this year were approximately 45 billion cubic meters lower than on 1 January 1982. This decrease, however, is less than the total natural gas production of 1982. Thus the natural gas supply situation has improved as, by the way, it has done for years. Gasunie estimates that it will take 30 years, as opposed to the 26 years estimated in 1981, to use up the proven supplies available today.

In addition to this proven offer, Gasunie is also aware of the concept of the expected offer where the proven offer is increased by the amount of natural gas found in new natural gas fields and by corrections made in the supplies available in existing fields. The expected offer amounts to 2,400 billion cubic meters. But here is a 50 percent chance that the amounts are either too high or too low. These supplies would last 54 years.

8889

CSO: 3620/416

OVERVIEW OF FRENCH SHIPPING PORTS IN 1982

Comparison 1981, 1982

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 9

[Article: "The Traffic of the French and European Ports in 1982"]

[Text] According to the still-provisional figures, the total tonnage of the merchandise unloaded and loaded in the maritime ports of continental France was on the order of 272.3 million tons in 1982 as against 300 million in 1981 --a decrease of about 9.3 percent, which is higher than the difference noted between 1980 and 1981 96 percent).

This situation is due not only to the oil traffic (on the order of 150.7 million tons in 1982 as against 170.4 million in 1981), which appears to have dropped about 11.5 percent, but also to other goods, which seem to have decreased to a lesser extent (7 percent); it should be noted that, according to the ATIC [Technical Association for Coal Importation], the coal-importation traffic dropped 17 percent (19 million tons in 1982 as against 23 million in 1981).

On the other hand, passenger traffic--not including that of the coastwise transport services--continued to grow, though less than in the preceding years, and can be estimated at about 20.6 million persons arriving and departing in 1982, as against 19.4 million in 1981 (up 6 percent); for cross-Channel traffic, the increase seems to have been 7.8 percent.

As regards the six autonomous maritime ports, an overall merchandise-traffic decrease on the order of 10.8 percent is noted.

Port by port, the situation is as follows:

- down 12.5 percent at Dunkerque (37.6 million tons in 1981; 32.9 million tons in 1982);
- down 20.6 percent at Le Havre (71.8 million tons in 1981, 58.2 million tons in 1982);
- down 11.3 percent at Rouen (21.3 million tons in 1981, 18.9 million tons in 1982);
- up 10.6 percent at Nantes-Saint-Nazaire (14.3 million tons in 1981, 15.8 million tons in 1982);

--down 13.2 percent at Bordeaux (12 million tons in 1981, 10.5 million in 1982);
--down 5.6 percent at Marseille (97 million tons in 1981, 91.6 million in 1982).

The traffic at the other metropolitan ports seems to have dropped only 1.6 percent (45.7 million tons in 1982 as against 46.4 million in 1981), with even some increases in some of them:

--up 10.6 percent at Calais (6.85 million tons in 1981, 7.65 million in 1982);
--up 30.8 percent at Treport (248,000 tons in 1981, 324,500 tons in 1982);
--up 13.7 percent at Fecamp (229,000 tons in 1981, 261,000 tons in 1982);
--up 3.4 percent at Cherbourg (1.94 million tons in 1981, 2 million in 1982);
--up 29 percent at Granville (95,000 tons in 1981, 122,000 in 1982);
--up 4.6 percent at Le legue (343,000 tons in 1981, 359,000 in 1982);
--up 5.5 percent at Roscoff (425,000 tons in 1981, 448,000 in 1982);
--up 34.6 percent at Rochefort (135,000 tons in 1981, 181,000 in 1982);
--up 8.8 percent at Toulon (337,000 tons in 1981, 367,000 in 1982)

The total traffic of the Port of Paris dropped by 8.2 percent (21 million tons in 1981, 19.2 million in 1982). Maritime traffic is up sharply, though.

The Rhine River traffic of the Port of Strasbourg is also down, by 10.5 percent (11.7 million tons in 1981, 10.5 million in 1982).

In the overseas departments, one notes a drop at the autonomous port of Guadeloupe (down 2.8 percent: 1.54 million tons in 1981, 1.5 million in 1982) and a slight increase in the ports of Reunion (up 3 percent: 1.25 million tons in 1981, 1.29 million in 1982) and Guyane (up 3.3 percent: 260,000 tons in 1981, 269,000 in 1982); at Fort-de-France, the traffic increase for the first 11 months is reported as 4.8 percent.

In the neighboring foreign ports, a variable development is noted from port to port; the provisional results in our possession are as follows;

--up 0.9 percent at Hamburg (61.4 million tons in 1981, 61.9 million in 1982);
--up 0.8 percent at Bremen-Bremerhaven (25.8 million tons in 1981, 26 million in 1982);
--down 0.4 percent at Rotterdam (253.4 million tons in 1981, 252.4 million in 1982);
--up 4.3 percent at Amsterdam (21.1 million tons in 1981, 22 million in 1982);
--up 6.5 percent at Antwerp (79.7 million tons in 1981, 85 million in 1982);
--up 18.5 percent at Ghent (19.3 million tons in 1981, 22.9 million in 1982);
--down 27.3 percent at Bruges-Zeebrugge (12.8 million tons in 1981, 9.3 million in 1982);
--down 6.4 percent at Genoa (48.3 million tons in 1981, 45.2 million in 1982);
--up 7 percent at Bilbao (20 million tons in 1981, 21.3 million in 1982).

Port of Marseille

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 10-11

[Article: "Marseille, the No 1 French Trading Port--Africa: 36.1 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] Marseille, the No 1 French port, with total traffic of 91,569,759 t in 1982, had a drop of 5.6 percent, connected with the decrease in fossil-fuels traffic (down 4 million tons in imports and down 2 million in exports) and with the decrease in general-merchandise traffic (down 1.5 percent), which dropped below the 10-million-ton line. The total for merchandise unloaded--down 4.4 percent--came to 74,531,902 t, and for merchandise loaded, 17,037,857 t (down 10.7 percent).

The fossil-fuels traffic, which represented 74 percent of total traffic, reached 67,840,977 t, including 60.1 million in imports (down 6.2 percent) and 7.7 million in exports (down 21.4 percent). General merchandise showed a slight increase of 8.6 percent in incoming goods and a drop of 5.9 percent in outgoing goods. One notes in particular the fluctuating flow of metallurgical products (imports up 93.5 percent and exports down 17.1 percent). Also in this miscellaneous-products sector, one notes the 57.6-percent drop in sugar exports (36,357 t) and the 7.3-percent drop in outgoing flours and pastes (242,247 t), as well as the rises in exports of plastic raw materials (up 16.2 percent, at 180,857 t) and cement (up 25.4 percent, at 106,879 t).

Solid loose cargoes, which represented 13.4 percent of general traffic, with 12,263,655 t, increased by 5.5 percent. Coal traffic by itself represented 3,788,932 t (3,370,583 t of which was imported), but was down 8.4 percent from 1981. The most remarkable increases were the imports of wheat (up 84.4 percent), at 194,929 t, and iron ore (up 13.4 percent), at 433,502 t, and the exports of salt (352,640 t) and caustic soda (722,670 t). Liquid loose cargoes rose by 11.8 percent, with total traffic of 1,541,868 t.

1,689 Departures for the Maghreb in 1982

Because of its favorable position on the Mediterranean, Marseille has heavy traffic with Africa, the northern countries especially. Total traffic reached 39,099,768 t in 1982, corresponding to 36.1 percent of the port's general traffic. Apart from fossil fuels, this traffic was lower, at 6,965,147 t--29.3 percent of miscellaneous traffic, solid and liquid loose cargoes. Incoming goods easily dominated this traffic (again, because of fossil fuels), with 36,052,428 t (including 31.9 million t of petroleum products), and outgoing goods totalled 3,047,340 t. Total traffic with the African continent increased by 8.8 percent (incoming goods up 12 percent and outgoing goods down 18.6 percent) over 1981.

As already indicated, the most important partners are in North Africa. They represented a total traffic of 22,898,424 t, including 22.1 million t in oil imports. In the lead is Algeria (10,976,849 t), followed by Egypt (7.78 million t), Libya (3.7 million), Tunisia (1.5 million) and Morocco (712,022 t).

apart from fossil fuels, the principal products imported are the phosphates (189,765 t) and citrus fruits from Morocco (41,403 t) and from Tunisia (20,149 t).

Of the traffic with Africa, 32.6 percent related to the west coast of Africa, with 12,754,288 t, including 9.7 million t in imports of fossil fuels (up 24 percent). Miscellaneous goods showed a drop of 7.6 percent in incoming goods and 10.5 percent in outgoing goods, largely connected with the disappearance of sugar exports and the drop in automobile exports to Nigeria. The exchanges with the rest of the African countries were as follows: East Africa, 169,804 t; Southern Africa, 1,102,332 t; and the Indian Ocean side, 333,841 t.

Among the incoming goods from the west coast of Africa were: iron ores from Liberia (632,678 t) and from Guinea (825,946 t); oil from Nigeria (7,945,020 t), from Gabon (1,092,168 t) and from Cameroon (424,157 t); peanut oils from Senegal (39,396 t); bananas (61,244 t) and pineapples (35,037 t) from the Ivory Coast, etc.

Marseille has many regular lines trading with the African ports on the Mediterranean and the west coast of Africa, totaling several thousand departures per year. The largest number are in the direction of North Africa (1,689 departures for the Maghreb alone): 1,000 departures for Algeria (up 0.3 percent), 506 for Tunisia, 183 for Morocco and 120 for Libya. For the west coast of Africa, a net decrease is to be noted, with 327 departures as against 392 in 1981 and 413 in 1980.

Port of Le Havre

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 12-13

[Article: "Le Havre: The drop in Fossil-Fuels Imports Felt Sharply--Africa: 22.6 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] Le Havre, the preeminent oil port, felt sharply the reduction in french fossil-fuels imports in 1982. Its total traffic, expressed in tonnage, dropped 20.7 percent, going from 73.4 million tons in 1981 to 58,228,000 tons in 1982. Incoming goods dropped 18.7 percent, at 45,795,000 tons, and outgoing goods, by 27.2 percent, at 11,262,000 tons. If one considers each sector separately, one notes that in the area of imports, liquid loose cargoes fell by 20 percent (crude oil by 27.4 percent), solid loose cargoes by 14.8 percent (coal by 20.6 percent), and miscellaneous merchandise by 12.3 percent (containers by 16 percent). On the level of exports, it is again liquid loose cargoes that showed the biggest drop (-45.5 percent), because of the oil sector, which fell by 52.8 percent, while cements rose by 10.9 percent and miscellaneous merchandise went down 6.4 percent.

In 1982, oil traffic as a whole represented 66.5 percent of the total traffic of the port of Le Havre, with incoming and outgoing goods totaling 38,758,000 tons (as against 50,725,000 in 1981), including 31.1 million tons of crude and 7.6 million tons of refined products. In 1982, coal reached 4,980,000 tons; cereals, 1,399,000 tons--up 1.5 percent; and cement, 792,000 tons (up 10.9 percent).

The increase in container traffic, which was one of Le Havre's spearheads, has halted, dropping to 5,322,000 tons in 1982 from 6,087,000 tons in 1981. On the other hand, RO/RO [Roll On/Roll Off] traffic (not including containers) rose to 2,041,000 tons--an increase of 11.9 percent. Conventional traffic remained stable at a little more than 1 million tons. Finally, passenger traffic maintained its growth, with 1,048,000 persons (up 1.8 percent).

Achievements in 1982

The year 1982 began with the placing in service of the new floating dock, designed for accommodating and repairing the biggest container ships and ore ships currently in service.

Within the framework of the restructuring of the old port, and in order to increase its receiving capacity for the fruit traffic, the port of Le Havre has undertaken some big improvement projects. A new fruit center was placed in service in March 1982. With capacity of 200,000 tons per year and a surface area of 60,000 m², on 26,000 m² of which it is equipped with isothermic or refrigerated sheds, it offers, in the first stage, 500 m of pier accessible to the most modern ships specializing in transport of fruits.

In order to handle the sharp increase in the traffic in cereals in sacks, a private investment company has set up a sacking station that can sack 3,000 50-kg sacks per hour, and empty-sack warehouse with capacity of 350,000 to 400,000 sacks, and a sack loader.

Furthermore, the year 1982 was marked by the inauguration of the Le Havre International Trade Center, which is to constitute a support for development of Le Havre's tertiary port activities.. This center has 16,000 m², including 9,000 m² of offices on six floors and 7,000 m² of services on the mezzanine and the ground floor. The services offered are: a congress center, a data bank available by videotex, and assistance to international trade.

In the social area, the new international medical center for seamen was inaugurated in November 1982. This center, covering a surface area of 776 m², comprises medical services, rest-and-relaxation rooms, and rooms for housing seamen whose state of health requires hospitalization.

Africa: 22.6 Percent of Total Traffic

The traffic with the African continent came to 13,184,000 t in 1982, which represents 22.6 percent of the total traffic of the port of Le Havre. Because of sizable imports of petroleum products, incoming goods dominated traffic at 11,718,000 t (up 18 percent), while outgoing goods came to only 1,466,500 t (up 5.5 percent).

Apart from the countries of North Africa, which are big exporters of oil (Algeria, Egypt, Libya) and South Africa (3,405,000 t), which ships its coal in particular, the port of Le Havre maintains with the countries of the west coast of Africa regular and numerous maritime relations that have become privileged ones over a number of years. Le Havre offers nine departures per week

to the west coast of Africa. A trading system based on the products imported from Africa is well-established at Le Havre. But it is also interesting to note that some new products have in recent times been added to the traditional exchanges.

The total traffic between the port of Le Havre and the countries of the west coast of Africa came to 4,234,000 t in 1982 (an 11-percent increase over 1981), 3,215,000 t of which was imported and 1,019,000 t exported. Containerized traffic alone is sizable--387,500 t. Le Havre's principal partners on the west coast of Africa are the Ivory Coast (344,000 t, 49.7 percent of it in cereal exports), Gabon (314,000 t, 82 percent of it in imports of crude oil), and Senegal (121,500 t, including 54 percent in cereal exports). The traffic with Nigeria (3,085,000 t) should also be stressed, but imports of crude oil occupy a large place in these statistics. Finally, Le Havre also has regular exchanges with the Congo (37,000 t), Togo (23,000 t), Liberia (20,000 t), Benin (18,000 t), Zaire (14,000 t), Sierra Leone, Ghana and Guinea.

Container traffic with the west coast of Africa was up slightly in 1982, topping 380,000 t. It involves mainly the Ivory Coast (129,000 t), Cameroon (94,000 t), Nigeria (47,000 t), Gabon (22,000 t) and Senegal (19,000 t).

Special investments have been made at Le Havre for the traffic with the countries of the west coast of Africa: a part of the port's third container terminal has been equipped for receiving the ships that take on cargo either in conventional packaging or in containers. Thus it has been equipped not only with gantry cranes for containers but also with cranes on tires and conventional cranes. A 15,000-m² shed has been assigned especially for the storage of this merchandise.

Port of Dunkerque

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 14-15

[Article. "Dunkerque: a Record Year for Cross-Channel Traffic--Africa: 17.8 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] Dunkerque experienced in 1982 a traffic decrease falling slightly below the national average, at -12.5 percent, but it confirmed its position as France's No 3 port--No 1 if liquid loose cargo is excepted. Its total traffic came to 32,971,000 t, as against 37,629,000 t in 1981. Imports were 25,805,000 t (down 13.1 percent), and exports, 7,112,000 t (down 10 percent).

Several factors contributed to this sharp drop. As regards imports, heavy and dense products registered a drop of 23 percent, with imported ores suffering from the reduction of activity in the steel sector (down 13 percent in 1982) and the technical shutdowns of two blast furnaces at Usinor-Dunkerque. Imports of coal for electric power plants also fell very sharply, because of the drop in consumption by EDF [French Electric Power Co], due to its choice of nuclear power (down 1.5 million t). The drop in coal for the steel industry was less sharp, because of the contracts linking that industry to its suppliers and to the cokeries. At the supplier level, South Africa was essentially the country that suffered the drop in 1982.

Fossil fuels showed a slight increase because of the rise in the incoming traffic in refined products (up 1.3 million t). The share of North Sea oil went up, while Algeria decreased its shipments. Metallurgical products had export difficulties, and the drop reached -24.4 percent. The cereal results were extremely unfavorable too: they dropped by 32.8 percent. We note that the destinations for that sector are concentrated, mainly toward Algeria. Finally, the tonnages of sugar exported dropped 13 percent.

As regards the other merchandise imported in 1982, one notes the increase in chemical products, which confirms Dunkerque's role as a petrochemical cross-roads, and the decrease in oil seeds (of which Sudan, with 37,000 t, is becoming a relatively important supplier), though this has been compensated for by an upswing in oil needs.

As regards outgoing goods, cements took a leap forward with heavy shipments of loose-cargo clinker, especially to Cape Verde, Guinea and Togo. One notes also the revival of shipments of flour to Mauritania and Cameroon.

For Dunkerque, cross-Channel traffic also resulted in a record year for passenger traffic, with 776,000 persons, an increase of 42 percent. The freight sector is also rising steadily; a considerable increase in the tonnage of general merchandise transported by freight car (Dunkerque-Dover) and in the number of trucks (up 35 percent in 1982). In toto, the balance-sheet for cross-Channel traffic came to 1.46 million tons (up 12.8 percent). The biggest increase was in accompanied automobiles: a 97-percent increase (87,000 units) in 1 year! Finally, attention should be drawn to road/rail traffic, which increased by 3 percent and the outlooks for which are expanding with the placing in service, in the Spring, of a new vertical-handling machine to replace the present horizontal-handling system. In order to permit this modification, 7,000 m² of open ground is being surfaced at the cross-Channel terminal of the West port.

As regards port-facilities work, the completion of the West port's terminal for heavy and dense materials will have constituted the essential part of 1982's achievements. This investment, on the order of Fr 352 million, enables bulk-cargo ships of the 200,000-ton class to tie up and can handle 4 million t per year. An investment of Fr 22 million is being made on the TTS [expansion unknown] sugar terminal to provide it with a second loading line and strengthen its competitiveness. Finally, it was decided in 1982 to release the credits necessary for starting the work to connect the West port to the navigable waterways network. The work should begin shortly, and extend over a 2-year period.

1983, Year of Recovery?

Despite a generally unfavorable economic context, a certain recovery could be noted in 1983. Fossil fuels should not have to suffer from the halt in refining at the SFBP [expansion unknown] unit. In effect, a supply agreement has been made between the latter and the CFR TOTAL [expansion unknown] that should enable the Flanders refinery to operate, in principle, at its maximum technical capacity (6 million t per year). On the other hand, increased shipments to

the Atlantic zone can be expected, while incoming refined products should tend to drop. In any case, these movements remain linked to the price situation in the international market. Imports of ores should not go up for the present users, but the new terminal for heavy and dense materials should make it possible to broaden the clientele.

Exports of chemical products could evolve even more favorably with the doubling, during 1983, of the hot unit of COPENOR's [expansion unknown] steam-cracking unit. As regards the low level of the agroalimentary traffic in 1982, due in principle to a dropoff in shipments, it could get back to normal in 1983. The imminent startup of the work to create a cereal terminal in the East port, to go into service in 1984, gives hope of an upswing in that sector. Finally, the sharp increase in the traffic of the regular lines in 1982 could have a very positive pull-along effect.

Africa: 17.8 Percent of Total Traffic

The traffic with the African continent in 1982 consisted in a tonnage of 5,884,000 t, including importation, or about 17.8 percent of the total traffic of the port of Dunkerque. Imports of iron ore (2.7 million t) represented 46.4 percent of this figure. It came mainly from Liberia, Mauritania and South Africa. Oil traffic (incoming and outgoing) amounts to very little in the trade with Africa, representing only 6.5 percent of the total. On the other hand, one should note the important position of coal (915,000 t), coming exclusively from South Africa, with 15.5 percent of the total.

The principal African countries involved in maritime relations with Dunkerque are South Africa (1,407,000 t), Liberia (1,160,000 t) and Mauritania (1,155,000 t). Coming in below 1 million tons are Nigeria (431,000 t), Algeria (326,000 t), the Ivory Coast (264,000 t) and Cameroon (161,000 t).

For the regular lines, Dunkerque's total traffic increased sharply (up 14 percent), and nine new services came into being in 1982. Thus the port's position was strengthened as regards destinations on the west coast of Africa (up 17 percent) and East Africa. Some new lines appeared with service to Egypt (Port Said, Alexandria), with the Egyptian Navigation Company, and to the west coast of Africa (Nouadhibou, Nouakchott), with the Mauritanian Navigation Co, and a conventional service to Nigeria with Antwerpen Maritiem.

Port of Rouen

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 16-17

[Article: "Rouen: the Best French Network of Regular Lines to the COA (West Coast of Africa)--Africa: 26.4 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] At Rouen, the year 1982 ended with total maritime traffic of 18,886,000 t, not including provisioning of ships. This figure thus represents a drop of 11.3 percent in relation to 1981's traffic, which totaled 21,297,000 t. The evolution of the Rouen traffic is therefore following the general trend of French port traffic, the dropoff of which in 1982 was on the

order of 10 percent. If one compares Rouen's results with those of the other maritime ports, the figure is an average one.

Rouen's traffic retained its principal characteristic in 1982--i.e., the predominance of exports in the traffic, which makes Rouen one of the leading French export ports, in tonnage. This situation has been maintained despite the 14.2-percent drop in exports (more pronounced than the 7.9-percent drop in imports), resulting essentially from the late start of the 1982-1983 cereal-export season.

With Rouen's traffic, two main categories of traffic must be distinguished, the evolution of which is entirely different: on the one hand, the industrial traffic, whose overall trend is downward (petroleum products, raw materials for fertilizers and the paper industry); and on the other hand, the transit and storage-distribution traffic, whose general trend is stable or upward (cereals, agroalimentary traffic in sacks--flour, sugar--and containers).

Imports totaled 9,065,000 t as against 9,845,000 t the preceding year, for a drop of 7.9 percent. They comprise, principally, 2,781,000 t of coal (down 10.2 percent), 1,527,000 t of phosphates (up 7 percent), 2,835,000 t of petroleum products (down 19.6 percent), and 937,000 t of miscellaneous merchandise (down 11.5 percent). This last-mentioned category suffered mainly from the dropoff in arrivals of products connected with the paper industry--down 29.6 percent for paper rolls (126,000 t) and down 36.1 percent for paper pulp (64,000 t); finished papers, for their part, dropped by 14.9 percent, with a tonnage of 249,000 t.

Exports reached 9.82 million t as against 11,451,000 t in 1981--a 14.2-percent decrease. As in the preceding year, exports were the major factor in Rouen's traffic. The essential reason for the drop in them was the 20-percent decline in loadings of cereals (4,596,000 t in 1982 as against 5.7 million t in 1981). While exports of refined petroleum products (2.17 million t) dropped 9 percent, the traffic in miscellaneous merchandise exported stayed practically stable (2,608,000 t), with the falloff limited to 1.2 percent. Refined sugar (521,000 t), sensitive to the evolution of the world market, showed a drop of 17.9 percent; shipments of flour (824,000 t), on the other hand, for which Rouen is the No 1 French port of embarkation, began to rise again (up 1.9 percent).

The total traffic in containerized merchandise for 1982 came to 1,209,000 t (as against 1,078,000 t), and the number of containers handled was on the order of 129,000 (as against 122,000 in 1981).

The Year of the Big Ships

The year 1982 was the one in which calls by big ships, especially ships with large unit cargoes, became common; this is the result of the work to improve access, started several years ago.

Thus Rouen quite regularly receives big coal ships from the United States, with deadweight capacity from 100,000 to 125,000 tons, laden with 50,000 to

60,000 tons of coal for EDF's thermal power plants, and on the other hand, Rouen has loaded several unit cargoes of 50,000 t of wheat on board ships with deadweight capacity of 100,000 t. The increase in ship size is also found in the line traffic; it was in 1982 that four container ships with capacity of 1,000 "boxes", plus one unit with capacity of 1,350 "boxes," were placed in service between Rouen and the COA.

The port of Rouen should prove even more attractive upon completion of a program to deepen the channel to 10 m for the trip down the Seine. This increase in the draft capacity offered will make it easier for the big container ships to call; they will thus be able to take on bigger unit cargoes, and there will be a distinct increase in the size of the unit cereal cargoes that can go out of Rouen.

Expansion of Specialized Equipment

A number of investments were made in the port of Rouen in 1982, but they will not produce their effects on the port's activity until during 1983. Their purpose is to strengthen the traffic in coal, cereals and miscellaneous merchandise, particularly in containers.

Some improvements have been built at the coal terminals of Grand-Couronne and Saint-Wandrille. They are related mainly to the increase in the size of the ships received. On the other hand, with a view to development of cereal exports (7 million tons per year as of about 1985), the capacity of the silos, which is currently 280,000 t, is going to be developed. Two extensions have been carried out (of 20,000 and 23,000 t, respectively), and two big projects (45,000 and 63,000 t) are in the pipeline.

The containerized traffic, have undergone considerable development in 10 years, going from 3,500 EVP [expansion unknown] in 1972 to 139,000 in 1982, has necessitated the setting-up of a new terminal with surface area of 8 hectares and offering a dock length of 460 m, with draft of 11.5 m.

The main thrust of the 1983 objectives of the autonomous port of Rouen is to get into a good position in the international competition, in the face of the big competitors in North Europe--in particular, Rotterdam, Ghent, and especially Antwerp. That is why the efforts are being made mainly in the direction of agrofood exports and toward strengthening of the regular lines.

As regards the agrofood sector, Rouen is planning to build a terminal specialized for exportation of products in sacs (flours and sugars) and equipped with large facilities for mechanized handling. For the regular lines, the port has decided to strengthen its presence in certain traditional sectors (North Africa, the Nordic countries) and is going in the direction of a certain diversification.

The Best French Network to the COA

Rouen currently has the best French network of regular lines to the west coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean--two destination for which this port has truly

been perceived as the major port of embarkation in France. The year 1982 opened with a number of new lines: to Guinea, with the Danish company Deep Sea Shipping; to East Africa (Djibouti, Mogadiscio, Dar-es-Salaam, etc) with the Mediterranean Shipping Company; to Mauritania, with the Mauritanian Maritime Navigation Co; and to Lagos, Nigeria, with an East German shipping line.

Total traffic with Africa (including Egypt) reached 4,998,700 tons in 1982, as against 5,558,362 t in 1981. This corresponds to 26.4 percent of the port of Rouen's total traffic. A 10.8-percent drop is related to the falloff in transport of flour to Egypt (down 27.7 percent) and in imports of petroleum products from Algeria (down 47.8 percent). Geographically, this traffic breaks down as follows (in tons):

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>Variation</u>
North Africa (including Egypt)	2,997,000	3,474,000	-13.8%
West Africa	1,694,000	1,738,000	- 2.3%
Other countries of Africa	307,000	343,000	-11.7%

In the course of 1982, the principal partners were first of all the countries of north Africa: Morocco (1,816,000 t), Egypt (457,000 t), Algeria (412,000 t), Tunisia (302,000 t). Next come those of the west coast: Nigeria (302,000 t), Togo (270,000 t), the Ivory Coast (227,000 t), Senegal (217,000 t), up 64.4 percent) and Cameroon (201,000 t).

As regards importation, Rouen received in 1982 oil from Algeria (124,000 t); phosphates from Morocco (1 million t), from Togo (227,000 t) and, in smaller quantities, from Senegal and Tunisia; woods from the Ivory Coast (15,000 t), from Cameroon (10,000 t) and from Gabon (8,800 t). On the export level, Rouen sent cereals to Morocco (652,000 t), Tunisia (194,000 t) and Algeria (158,000 t); flour to Egypt (422,000 t), Cameroon (30,500 t) and Algeria (29,000 t); refined sugar to Nigeria (84,000 t); and finally, vehicles to Nigeria, Morocco, the Ivory Coast and Algeria.

Containerized traffic in 1982 involved mainly the countries of the Maghreb: Morocco (43,700 t), Algeria (44,000 t), Tunisia (13,000 t); those of the COA, with total weight of 549,000 t (up 12 percent over 1981), the most important of which were Nigeria (183,000 t), the Ivory Coast (123,000 t) and Cameroon (82,000 t); and finally, those of the Indian Ocean, with Mauritius (26,000 t) and Madagascar (7,000 t).

Port of Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 18-19

[Article: "Nantes-Saint-Nazaire: the Best Score of the Big French Ports--Africa: 31.7 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] For the autonomous port of Nantes-Saint-Nazaire, the year 1982 was marked above all by the placing in service, on 19 March, of the methane terminal of Montoir, which is receiving part of the Algerian gas coming to France and, temporarily, the gas going to Belgium, while the placing in service of

the Zeebrugge terminal is awaited. Montoir should receive 4.6 million tons of LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas] in 1983 and 6.5 million tons as of 1985.

The arrival of the Algerian gas has further accentuated the importance of the bulk energy cargoes (crude oil, refined products, LNG and coal) in the port's traffic, since last year they represented, at 12.3 million tons, nearly 78 percent of total external traffic (80 percent of incoming traffic and 61 percent of outgoing). But there is also sizable traffic in other liquid bulk cargoes (notably liquefied ammoniac and molasses) and solid bulk cargoes (feed cakes, soybeans, raw natural phosphates, etc), as well as miscellaneous merchandise (in which woods and ferrous products predominate). Last year, unloadings of feed cakes increased by 37 percent and imports of woods remained stable, while cereal exports fell by 61 percent (a record had been reached in 1981 with 740,000 t), and flour increased, though to a far lesser extent in tonnage.

Traffic Up

At 15.79 million t, the total traffic for the year 1982 was up 10.6 percent over the preceding year (14,273,000 t); it breaks down as follows, by traffic category:

Crude oil	5,890,000 t
Refined fossil fuels	3,650,000 t
LNG	2,200,000 t
Other liquid bulk cargoes	330,000 t
Coal	560,000 t
Other solid bulk cargoes	2,010,000 t
Miscellaneous merchandise	<u>1,150,000 t</u>
Total	15,790,000 t

As always, incoming goods (14.07 million t) far exceeded the outgoing goods (1.72 million t).

It should be stressed that in 1982, with overall traffic up 10.6 percent, Nantes-Saint-Nazaire has the best score of the big French ports, thus going against a general current of recession--a favorable result due indisputably to the startup of the LNG traffic. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the other traffic held up well on the whole.

In 1983, the traffic trend should be particularly favorable, the forecast being 19 to 20 million t. This very encouraging situation should be mainly the consequence of development of imports of LNG and a slight increase for crude oil (with the placing in service of the new units of the Donges refinery and greater concentration of the imports of Elf-France).

The advances in the agrofood sector and in exports of miscellaneous goods, connected with the new technical installations gradually being placed in service (container terminal and agrofood terminal), should also make their contribution to the growth of port activity as a whole.

As of 1985, the traffic outlook is for nearly 26 million tons, including 6.6 million t of crude oil, 4.1 million of refined products, 6.5 million of LNG and 3.8 million of coal. An increase is expected also for the traffic in livestock feed, fertilizers and cereals.

The work continued last year on construction of Montoir's various terminals: the miscellaneous-merchandise and container terminal (completion of the first docking berth); the coal terminal (continuance of the pier-construction work); and the agrofood terminal (start of construction of the Montoir 3 dock). The construction of an additional oil-tanker station and the operation to deepen the channel for receiving methane tankers, being carried out in association with Gaz de France, should also be noted.

Africa: 31.7 Percent of Total Traffic

With about 5 million tons (including 4.7 million in incoming products), Africa was in 1982, and will continue to be, a very important partner of the port.

North Africa easily leads, with 3.37 million tons, with Algeria No 1 (it alone shipped 3 million tons, including 2.2 million tons of LNG and 362,200 t of crude oil); but it received only 952 t of miscellaneous merchandise. Morocco accounted for 325,000 t, including 221,000 t of incoming goods (essentially, 168,000 t of natural phosphates) and 103,000 t of outgoing goods (including 73,400 t of wheat). The figures for Tunisia are more modest: the total traffic reached only 41,000 t.

Traffic with the west coast of Africa exceeded 1 million t, but involved mainly imports (962,000 t in 1982). The three main partners for arriving goods were Nigeria (485,000 t), Libya (192,000 t) and Gabon (173,409 t); these tonnages consisted almost entirely of crude oil. As regards goods exported, for which the tonnages are far lower, the No 1 customer is the Ivory Coast, with 17,000 t, followed by Senegal (15,000 t).

Finally, the other countries of Africa accounted for 613,161 t, involving incoming goods essentially (548,000 t). One notes in particular the shipments of oil from Libya (192,000 t) and of coal from South Africa (226,000 t), which illustrates once again the preponderance of energy products in Nantes-Saint-Nazaire's total traffic.

We point out that 1982 will have marked a new stage in service of the COA, with improvement in the quality of export service (Dakar in 6 days, Abidjan in 9 days, etc). The two shipping lines that provide regular connections--Scadoa and Sitram--have increased the number of calls they make for export purposes. Starting in February 1983, this potential for service to the COA was strengthened by the Societe Navale Caennaise.

We mention by way of conclusion that the 3.5-m increase in draft produced by the construction of the methane terminal has opened up enormous potentialities for the autonomous port of Nantes-Saint-Nazaire. The white paper for the port, which is a forward-looking document aimed at defining the strategy for port improvement of the Basse-Loire between now and the end of the century, was officially presented.

Port of Bordeaux-Le Verdon

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 20-21

[Article: "Bordeaux-Le Verdon: Merchandise Traffic, Not Counting Fossil Fuels, Is Equivalent to That of 1981--Africa: 15.4 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] The traffic of the port of Bordeaux-Le Verdon, with a total of 10.5 million t for 1982, was down 13 percent from the preceding year. The drop in fossil fuels (6.5 million as against 8 million t in 1981) is what explains this result. The other kinds of goods ran up practically the same score as in the preceding year 94 million t).

Thus if one considers the traffic other than fossile fuels, one notes that the Gironde port, with a falloff of 1.8 percent, did not do so badly among French ports as a whole, despite the difficult economic situation.

Fossil fuels, at a total of 6.5 million t, fell nearly 20 percent below 1981. In this regard, the port of Bordeaux suffered the full backlash of the economic difficulties and the actions taken in the area of energy-saving. It should also be kept in mind, in this regard, that Aquitaine is one of the few French producing regions, both for oil and for gas.

Taking imports and exports together, the other liquid bulk cargoes totaled 393,000 t, which represents a 23-percent increase. The principal products were benzene and cumene, which, totaling 156,000 t, rose by 40 percent, and vegetable oils (105,000 t), the 18-percent increase in which was due mainly to the exports from the Bordeaux-Oleagineux mill. As for molasses (57,000 t), for animal feed, their traffic doubled last year.

Solid Bulk Cargoes Down

Solid bulk cargoes totaled 2,249,000 t--down 6 percent. The most important were, first of all, oleaginous products--680,000 t and up 7 percent; cereals --500,000 t, down 8 percent from 1981; and fertilizers (442,000 t), which went up 15 percent. The tonnage for the fertilizer sector consisted of 208,000 t of phosphates (up 8 percent), and 24,000 t of potash (down 14 percent) and imported manufactured fertilizers 9165,000 t), which went up 27 percent, and exported manufactured fertilizers (45,000 t), up 23 percent.

Finally, industrial solid bulk cargoes dropped 22 percent. This traffic of 495,000 t was composed of coal (264,000 t), down 36 percent, and iron ore (231,000 t), up 7 percent.

To these four major categories should be added the traffic in sugar (62,000 t) and in refractory earths (52,000 t). Finally, the near-disappearance of wood turnings (5,000 t as against 78,000 t in 1981) was noted.

The result achieved in 1982 in the miscellaneous-merchandise category (1.3 million t) was encouraging, since despite the difficult economic situation, it held up very well, even increasing slightly (1 percent). Apart from manufac-

tured products, which represented one of the "original features" of the Bordeaux port traffic, a sacked-goods traffic (285,000 t) that dropped 8 percent and was composed essentially of 181,000 t of cereals (down 13 percent) and 104,000 t of flour (up 3 percent) was noted. But the good showing (up 18 percent) by wood should be noted also (200,000 t).

Finally, containers went up 8 percent, reaching 500,000 t, of which 400,000 t transited via the Verdon terminal. The containerization rate for miscellaneous merchandise in the Gironde port went from 36 percent to 39 percent.

Some 20 Lines to Africa

Regular-line ships, which constitute one of the cornerstones of the development policy of the port of Bordeaux-Le Verdon, transported 770,000 t (up 5 percent). In 1983 it had more than 40 such lines, about half of them working with the African countries. The west coast of Africa is the geographical sector that had the most regularly scheduled services (one ship per day). There is a major reason for this: Bordeaux is the closest French port on the Atlantic coast. Thus the container ships that call at the Verdon terminal take less than 5 days to reach Dakar and only 7 days to Abidjan.

One notes that the lines to and from the COA came at the top of the 1982 list for all regular lines, with traffic of 292,000 t (up 5 percent), including 160,000 t in containers. The Indian Ocean lines, for their part, accounted for 70,000 t, including 27,000 t in containers (up 13 percent), and the Moroccan lines, 60,000 t, with a 25-percent increase for container cargo.

One essential explanation for this result is that in 1982 the autonomous port of Bordeaux finished a complete restructuring of the port sector of Bassens, close to the Bordeaux urban district. At this site, now suited to all traffic (except for fossil fuels), many specialized installations are now available. We mention, by way of example, a controlled-climate shed, a terminal for tropical woods, a bulk-cargo terminal, and oilseed terminal and a cereal terminal. Furthermore, the placing in service of the Verdon terminal has contributed a great deal to the tropical-products traffic. These products constitute about half of the container-importation traffic of the port of Bordeaux-Le Verdon.

In 1982 the port of Bordeaux received a total of nearly 1.15 million t of merchandise arriving from Africa and exported 470,000 t to that continent, which represents about 15.4 percent of the port's total traffic. The exchanges with the African countries consisted mainly of petroleum products coming from Egypt (126,000 t), Algeria (124,000 t), crude oil from Nigeria (176,000 t), phosphates from Senegal (118,500 t) and from Morocco (71,000 t). The iron from Mauritania, the molasses and sugar from Mozambique and Mauritius, etc, should also be noted.

Also notable among this traffic is the favorable trend in reception of woods from the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Cameroon (up 10 percent), and the fact that imports of citrus fruits from Morocco (15,600 t) are holding up well.

The containerized tonnage exchanged with West Africa went from 122,000 t in 1981 to 127,500 t in 1982. For the Indian Ocean, the results were, respectively, 21,000 t and 23,400 t.

Analysis by sector places in relief the relations with the COA: exchanges reached 592,000 t in imports and 248,000 t in exports, as against 450,000 and 130,000 t, respectively, for the countries of North Africa and 107,000 and 90,000 t for those of the Indian Ocean. The products incoming from the COA were mainly: petroleum products (32.7 percent), fertilizers (20 percent), ores (17.5 percent); and the outgoing goods were: manufactured articles (34 percent), foodstuffs (28.4 percent) and agricultural products (21.7 percent). The imports from North Africa consisted mainly of petroleum products (58.6 percent) and fertilizers (28.4 percent), and the exports were foodstuffs 950.7 percent) and agricultural products (19.2 percent).

Bordeaux-Le Verdon's principal African partners in 1982 were Senegal (198,500 t), Morocco (192,000 t), Nigeria (189,000 t), Egypt (187,000 t), Algeria (141,000 t), Mauritania (127,500 t), the Ivory Coast (94,000 t), etc.

Port of Sete

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 22-23

[Article: "Sete: Down 1.7 Percent from 1981--Africa: 45 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] The total traffic of the port of Sete was 7,678,000 t in 1982--a tonnage loss of 139,000 (down 1.77 percent) as compared with 1981, and a drop which, as we have noted on several occasions, is shared by most French ports but is small. The average size of the ships continued to rise; the net tonnage increased by 8.4 percent, and the number of ships by 4.78 percent. The incoming-goods total was 5,408,000 t (down 2.9 percent) and the total for outgoing goods was 2,269,000 t (up 1.7 percent). The total merchandise traffic, not including fossil fuels, was 2,384,000 t (down 10.5 percent) in 1982.

The leading category in the port of Sete's traffic, liquid bulk cargo, represented 5,797,000 t (including 4,378,000 t incoming and 1,419,000 t outgoing)--i.e., 75.4 percent of port traffic--and increased by 1.83 percent in 1982. Imports of crude oil were 3.68 million t. The drop was 5.1 percent, in line with the current trend in the oil-supply sector. The sources were diversified, the main suppliers being African countries for a grand total of 2,330,500 t, or 63.3 percent of total incoming oil and 67.3 percent of the port of Sete's total trade with Africa. In the lead was Nigeria (967,000 t), followed by Egypt (735,000 t) and Libya (597,000 t), to which must be added a more modest quantity from Liberia (32,200 t). Export activity in refined products developed sharply in 1982, with 1,411,000 t (up 23 percent), and involved, among others, Italy, Great Britain and the west coast of Africa (Senegal, Togo, Congo), as well as Sudan and Egypt.

The wine traffic, a traditional activity of the port, decreased in 1982: 4,747,000 hl [hectoliters] incoming (down 8.5 percent) and exports 220,000 hl

(down 14.3 percent). Imports of Algerian wines topped 26,000 t and represented nearly half of total imports from Algeria.

Solid or heavy-and-dense bulk cargoes totaled 704,000 t in 1982--9.1 percent of total port traffic, and down 21.4 percent. Incoming goods reached 522,000 t, and outgoing, 182,000 t. Imports of phosphates came to 195,000 t, including 81,000 t from Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. Imports of manganese ore (127,000 t, including 54,000 t from the Congo and Gabon) were up 27.4 percent. Other categories: feed cakes and livestock feed, 105,000 t (up 18 percent); exports of cereals, 119,000 t (down 52 percent), the principal importers of which were Algeria and Morocco--56,000 t; and imports of ferrochrome, 16,600 t.

Miscellaneous merchandise has topped 1 million tons for several years--1,117,000 t in 1982 (down 4.16 percent)--and represents 15.3 percent of total traffic. The traffic in wood went up very slightly, with 260,000 t (up 3.5 percent), because of the increase in arrivals of tropical woods in log form, two-thirds of which comes from the COA, and of sawn lumber. In 1982 the port of Sete remained the No 2 French port for importation of tropical woods. The Ivory Coast was the principal supplier, at 118,000 t, followed by Cameroon at 15,000 t and Gabon at 10,000 t. The exports comprised mine timber (13,000 t), mainly to Morocco, and railroad ties to Algeria (7,400 t). The paper-pulp traffic went up 26.3 percent in 1982, with a total of 67,000 t. Exports of live animals, which picked up at Sete in 1981, practically doubled in 1982 with about 23,000 head of large livestock, going essentially to Tunisia. A total of 90,000 t of cements and clinkers went to Algeria, Tunisia and Cameroon. Sete is also a regular receiver of coffee, with 21,000, including 5,600 t from the Ivory Coast.

Containerization has for several years occupied an important place at Sete, representing 42.1 percent of miscellaneous merchandise in 1982, with tonnage of 496,500 t (down 0.96 percent), equivalent to 48,000 units. It should be noted that Sete is the No 5 French port for containers, practically on the same level with Bordeaux-Le Verdon.

For the first time, the marine terminals had a total transit traffic of more than 110,000 passengers. The lines to Algeria (64,000 passengers) and Morocco (33,800 passengers) were up 4.3 and 1.4 percent, respectively.

In the short term, the port of Sete is going to acquire different kinds of new equipment; an 11,700-t cereal silo; a gantry crane for containers, which is planned to be placed in service in May 1984; two new RO/RO stations, in the second half of 1983; and a multicargo (bulk cargo) dock that will be able to receive ships of 65,000 t deadweight capacity and will be equipped with two 12-t cranes and one 20-t crane.

Africa Represents 36.5 Percent of Total Traffic, Not Including Fossil Fuels

Total traffic with Africa, including fossil fuels, reached 3,460,500 t in 1982, representing 45 percent of the port of Sete's total traffic. Not including fossil fuels, it represented 872,000 t, or 36.5 percent of the total.

The most important African partners (including fossil fuels) are: Nigeria, 972,000 t; Egypt, 761,000 t; Libya, 608,000 t; Algeria, 222,000 t; the Ivory Coast, 156,000 t; Morocco, 136,000 t; Senegal, 125,000 t; Tunisia, 80,000 t; the Congo, 66,800 t, etc.

Sete offers 85 monthly departures via regular lines, many of them to the Mediterranean and the west coast of Africa. North Africa is served especially well, with 12 departures per month for Algeria and Oran (plus five to nine passenger services to Oran), 3 per month to Casablanca (plus one passenger service to Tangiers every 4 days), and 2 per week to Tunisia. Egypt is covered by four departures per month, and Libya by three, while there are 10 monthly departures to 17 ports of the COA.

Port of La Rochelle Pallice

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 23

[Article: "La Rochelle Pallice: No 1 European Port for Importation of Tropical Woods--Africa: 18 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] La Rochelle Pallice, the No 9 French port, with total traffic of 3,824,800 t (down 14.7 percent), is also the No 1 European port for importation of tropical woods, which in 1982 represented 95.8 percent of total imports of woods and veneers.

Historical reasons underlie the origin of this sizable traffic. From the 19th century, the wood industry used the poplars produced in the region, particularly in the numerous marshes, for making boxes and laminates. This manufacturing developed strongly; there came to be a shortage of poplar, and it had to be replaced by imported woods, mainly tropical woods. At present, these woods come essentially from the west coast of Africa, and to a lesser extent, from Asia and Guiana.

In 1982, the principal supplier countries were Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, the Congo, Cameroon, etc. The principal species that come through La Rochelle Pallice are:

- mainly okoume, which comes almost exclusively from the Congo and Gabon;
- the species that lend themselves easily to rotary-cutting, such as meronti, kondrotti, alone, eyong, aiele, ilomba, samba, sapelli, etc. In addition to these there are, of course, all the so-called secondary woods that the producing countries promote.

The port of La Rochelle Pallice is particularly well-organized for efficient handling of this traffic, which reached nearly 500,000 t in 1982. In addition to experienced dock personnel, it has a lot of special equipment (log clamps, log trucks and rail cars, elevators, etc) for achieving high and well-regarded handling rates.

We note that total traffic with Africa reached 693,730 t in 1982, or about 18 percent of the port's total traffic, including 498,617 t of incoming goods and

195,113 t of outgoing goods. Exchanges with North Africa totaled 264,809 t; with West Africa, 120,711 t; and with Central and East Africa, 308,210 t (including 279,059 t of woods imported). Among the other products imported from Africa we note wood pulps from Morocco, phosphates from Algeria, and cotton, coffee and cacao.

Port of Calais

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 24

[Article: "Calais: No French Passenger Port--Africa: 1.4 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] Because of its close position in the Pas-de-Calais narrows, the port of Calais was chosen very early as the port of passage for relations between great Britain and continental Europe. Its principal vocation is to be a rapid port for passengers and vehicles. Its position as the place of transit for travelers to and from England is predominant, thanks to the very large number of maritime and air-maritime services to Dover and Folkestone. This made it the No 1 French port for passengers in 1982, the No 1 port for passenger cars and commercial vehicles, and the No 1 port for ship movements (27,289). These positions were achieved because of the equipment of the port of Calais: the modern facilities of the rail maritime station for double-purpose ships, the new train-ferry terminal,, the cross-Channel, whose 3-storey building covers 3,500 m², the modern hoverport for receiving giant hovercraft, etc.

Nevertheless, because of the industrial development of the region, the port of Calais also has a commercial vocation. Its port installations provide access to ships up to 25,000 tons deadweight capacity, and it also has a Roll-on/Roll-off terminal that offers the maritime industrialists 11,000 m² of storage area and three docking places.

Calais received 7,815,198 passengers in 1982, an increase of 7.5 percent over the preceding year.

The traffic via train-ferry is by far the heaviest; the ships transported 6,433,649 passengers, thus experiencing a growth of 12.5 percent over the figure for 1981, which was a very good year. On the other hand, the regrouping of the hovercraft into a single company momentarily disturbed the traffic of the international hoverport, which, with 1,375,883 passengers, suffered a drop of 11 percent.

The transit of vehicles--both touring and commercial and new vehicles, import and export together--achieved the record level of 1,452,553 units, including 360,884 commercial vehicles.

No 8 Port for Merchandise

The merchandise traffic for 1982 reached 7,655,000 t, including 3,804,000 t in incoming goods and 3,851,000 t in outgoing goods, amounting to an increase of 10.5 percent over 1981.

the principal import traffic involves long-voyage traffic, such as the titanium scoria from Canada; nonferrous ores from South America, North Africa, Ireland and Sweden (249,000 t); anthracite (350,000 t); oil coke; sea gravels and scrap metal from England; sulfur from the Aquitaine Basin and Poland (71,000 t); refined petroleum products from The Netherlands, Belgium and England (81,000 t); and cellulose and paper pulps from Scandinavia (143,000 t, down 10 percent).

On the export level, the increase in the agrofood traffic was considerable, in the form of bulk red sugar in sacks (66,000 t) going to Russia, Scandinavia, North Africa and South America; foundry coke (90,000 t) and pit coal (53,000 t) to Scandinavia, Ireland, Portugal and South America; while miscellaneous merchandise in containers (19,000 t, up 17 percent) or in bulk loads continue to increase because of the regular lines to Tunisia and the west coast of Africa, and liquid chemical products thanks to the specialized port installations for handling transit of them.

These maritime trade currents and the importance of the respective traffic in them confirm Calais' No 1 position as the European hinge between the continent and Great Britain and as France's No 8 merchandise port. That is why a vast program of port improvement will be undertaken in 1983, beginning with construction of the new East jetty, which will make it possible to widen the entrance from 130 to 200 m and to increase the surface area of the outer harbor from 2 to 18 hectares (cost: Fr 300 million). For the future, it is planned to create a deep-water basin, the studies for which are currently in progress.

Africa: 1.4 Percent of Total Traffic

The port of Calais' total traffic with the African continent, which in 1982 was 106,100 t, corresponding to about 1.4 percent of the port's total traffic, is down 14.7 percent from 1981. Imports came to 11,900 t, exclusively from Morocco, which supplies lead and zinc ores. Exports reached 94,200 t, and went in particular to Cameroon (22,400 t), the Congo (15,700 t), Morocco (15,200 t, 67 percent of it raw sugar), Gabon (10,300 t), the Ivory Coast (8,900 t), Egypt (6,000 t, raw sugar only), Tunisia (6,000 t), etc.

The regular lines to or from Africa connect Tunisia, via Cotunav, with one departure every 3 weeks for Tunis, Sousse and Sfax; and the west coast of Africa, with three departures per month, to all the major ports of the COA, via the Societe Navale Caennaise and Sitram.

Port of Boulogne

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 25

[Article: "Boulogne: Drop in Incoming Paper Pulp--Africa: 27.2 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] The port of Boulogne-sur-Mer is both a well-known fishing port (the No 1 French port), an essential axis for cross-Channel traffic, and also an important trading port. In 1982, its general traffic dropped 5.1 percent, with 3,872,153 t as against 4,080,597 t in 1981.

This general traffic breaks down as follows:

- merchandise traffic, commercial port: 2,126,965 t (down 7.7 percent);
- cross-Channel merchandise traffic; 566,032 t (down 12.2 percent);
- cross-Channel registered-vehicle traffic: 916,706 t (up 4 percent);
- provisioning: 146,179 t;
- products of the sea (incoming): 116,271 t (up 0.1 percent).

The commercial port's importations of merchandise reached 1,068,992 t, down 5.9 percent. The principal incoming products were: ores (48.3 percent of total imports), at 516,507 t (up 7.5 percent); paper pulps, 267,953 t (down 17.8 percent); papers, 117,815 t (down 8.1 percent); woods and cork, 63,182 t (down 14 percent). The biggest increase was in fertilizers, up 53.7 percent (10,398 t).

The outgoing merchandise traffic reached 1,057,973 t, down 9.5 percent. The principal exports were clinkers (62.8 percent of export traffic), at 665,093 t, down 13.5 percent; cement and lime, up 67 percent at 184,927 t; ferromanganese and ferroalloys, with 116,093 t (down 52.1 percent). The abrupt rise in sugar exports must also be added; it went from 5,882 t in 1981 to 52,774 t in 1982.

The traffic with Africa represented 27.2 percent of the port of Boulogne's general traffic in 1982, at 1,052,320 t, including 457,481 t in incoming goods and 594,839 t in outgoing goods.

Almost all the imports consist of metallurgical ores: 315,123 t from the Congo and 184,826 t from South Africa. On the other hand, 6,403 t of paper pulp arrived from Morocco, and 1,129 t of wood from Liberia. Exports were mainly to the COA--in particular, to the Ivory Coast (255,246 t), Nigeria (170,836 t) and Benin (126,805 t). As regards the export merchandise, clinkers dominated with 383,793 t (69 percent of exports to Africa), and cements and lime, with 182,866 t (30.7 percent of exports to Africa).

Port of Dieppe

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 26

[Article: "Dieppe: Sizable Drop in Exports--Africa: 133,000 t of Fruits and Vegetables Imported"]

[Text] In 1981, the port of Dieppe lost its position as France's No 1 banana port and No 2 fruit port, behind Marseille, with the transfer to Le Havre of the Antilles banana traffic. Nevertheless, thanks to its favored geographic situation, close to both Paris and London, Dieppe has retained one winning card: cross-Channel traffic.

But 1982 was not a favorable year for the port either: the last importations of fruits and vegetables from the Antilles disappeared almost completely, and the Dieppe-Newhaven line had to cope with some company conflicts. Thus it is noted that cross-Channel RO/RO traffic as a whole decreased by 18.4 percent in imports and 22.2 percent in exports, despite an increase for the Dieppe-Shoreham line.

Dieppe's total traffic came to 1,667,941 t in 1982 as against 1,937,072 t in 1981--a drop of 13.9 percent. Imports, at 967,562 t, dropped by 10.3 percent, and exports, at 700,379 t, by 18.4 percent. The principal imports were gravels and sands, at 421,792 t (down 10.4 percent), which Dieppe is in the process of making a specialty of; bananas, which dropped another 8.7 percent, to 80,041 t; and citrus fruits, coming exclusively from Morocco and up 46.5 percent, at 59,526 t. It should be noted that most of the banana imports were from the African continent: Cameroon, 46.9 percent, and the Ivory Coast, 23.3 percent. Export drops were as follows: vegetable oils, down 23.7 percent (44,482 t in 1982); cereals down 56.7 percent (31,854 t); and feed cakes down 40.7 percent.

The 1982 traffic with the African countries reached 132,967 t, consisting solely in imports of fruits, citrus fruits and vegetables, from Morocco (76,165 t), Cameroon (38,151 t) and the Ivory Coast (18,651 t). There were also exports from Dieppe in 1982, to Algeria.

In 1982 the port of Dieppe continue its efforts to improve the installations for reception of fruits, by the acquisition of new refrigerated depots and by improvement of the existing sheds. On the other hand, because of the development of building and public-works activity in the region (in particular, the construction of the Penly nuclear power plant), the port of Dieppe, which receives gravels and sands extracted from the ocean several miles from the coast, has had to try to adapt to the new market constraints, because the present installations and the rate of movement of the dredges, which is dependent on the tides, made the unloading of the dredged materials by the traditional methods uncompetitive. In parallel, the Chamber of Commerce, which runs the port, decided to create an outer harbor with a multicargo terminal for bulk cargoes.

The first phase of the work, completed in March 1983 [as published], made it possible to increase the surface area of the port by another 10 ha. The final project is for 30 ha to be reclaimed from the sea with the lengthening of the west sea-wall. Installation of a new pier for cross-Channel traffic, designed for bigger RO/RO ships, and complementary improvements, will make it possible to develop miscellaneous-merchandise traffic, containerized or palletized.

Port of Caen

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 pp 26-27

[Article: "Caen: Results Identical to 1981--Africa: 18 Percent of Total"]

[Text] The traffic of the port of Caen totaled 2,073,945 t in 1982. This result was identical to that of 1981, as was the breakdown between incoming and outgoing goods. Apart from fossil fuels, 1982 was characterized by a 5.5-percent drop in traffic.

The biggest traffic was that generated by the Societe Metallurgique de Normandie (down 58,000 t), with tonnage of 1,126,077 t, or 54.3 percent of the port's total traffic and 60.5 percent of traffic not including fossil fuels (60.1 percent in 1981).

Incoming ore and coal, which totaled 893,077 t, was at the same level as in 1981. Exports of steel dropped by 71,000 t, totaling only 234,633 t.

Exotic woods, at 163,025 t, dropped by 22.8 percent (47,000 t). As for northern woods, the tonnage reached 25,335 t in 1982--an increase of 12,000 t over 1981. Exports of cereals in 1982 were characterized by an 11,000-t drop, totaling 212,651 t.

Bulk-cargo traffic (sand, domestic coal, fertilizers, etc) remained nearly stable in relation to 1981; it came to about 160,000 t.

The miscellaneous-merchandise traffic in 1982 accounted for 126,349 t--an increase of 26 percent over 1981. This increase was due partly to the containerized traffic to Algeria, which in 1982 saw the entry into service of a third ship of the Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation serving the port of Caen. On the other hand, 1982 was marked by sugar-export traffic of 28,000 t.

Finally, there was the fossil-fuels traffic, which, though fluctuating a lot, totaled about 225,000 t in 1982, 107,670 t more than in 1981.

Traffic with Africa 18 Percent of Total Traffic

In 1982, traffic with the African continent approached 370,000 t, which represented 18 percent of the port of Caen's traffic. Imports from and exports to Africa were roughly of the same magnitude in terms of tonnage.

The main traffic flows in 1982, in decreasing order of importance, were with the Ivory Coast (72,000 t), Gabon (69,000 t), Algeria (68,000 t) and Morocco (49,000 t).

As for merchandise traffic, the incoming goods consisted mainly of exotic woods. In fact, the port of Caen is one of the very top French ports for woods and is well-known for this specialty.

As for outgoing goods, the merchandise broke down in various cereals and iron. As regards miscellaneous merchandise, the existence of the container line that serves Algeria regularly and frequently should be noted, as well as the line to the west coast of Africa, one of the port of Caen's best-regarded maritime lines.

Port of Bayonne

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 27

[Article: "Bayonne: Stability of Traffic--Africa: 14.3 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] Bayonne, a medium-size port run by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, has the particular characteristic of being oriented toward the chemical industry. A big importer of phosphates, it maintains a regular traffic with the African producer countries. Its status as a crude-oil exporting port should also be noted.

in 1982, the port of Bayonne did not experience the recession that hit most of the French ports, and achieved a tonnage almost identical, at 1,185,000 t, to that of 1981. Imports (30 percent of the total) reached 977,000 t, including 574,000 t in raw phosphates, and exports totaled 2,208,000 t, including 886,000 t of sulfur, 749,000 of cereals and 327,000 t of crude oil.

Traffic with Africa in 1982 constituted 14.3 percent of total traffic, at 455,000 t, including 311,000 t of incoming goods and 144,000 t of outgoing. Heading the list of the countries concerned are Togo (132,000 t, entirely in phosphate imports), Tunisia (93,000 t), Morocco (68,000 t), Algeria (65,000 t) and the Ivory Coast (38,000 t). The port of Bayonne also trades with Benin (16,500 t), Egypt, Guinea, Libya and the Congo.

Port of Port-Vendres

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Jan 83 p 27

[Article: "Port-Vendres: 4.3-Percent General Decrease in Traffic--Africa: 74.2 Percent of Total Traffic"]

[Text] The port of Port-Vendres experienced a slight drop--4.3 percent--in its activity in 1982, with total traffic of 234,500 t, including 80,700 t in incoming goods and 153,800 t outgoing. This traffic is especially with the Mediterranean countries, and consists mainly of imports of early vegetables and citrus fruits, grape must and paper in rolls, and exports of flour and apples.

The traffic with Africa came to 174,100 t in 1982, representing 74.2 percent of the general traffic of the port of Port-Vendres. The principal partner is Morocco, essentially for early vegetables and citrus fruits a bit of ammonium-nitrate fertilizers. The other African countries concerned are Egypt, Angola, Sudan, Mauritania, Niger (flour) and South Africa (oranges).

11267

CSO: 3519/583

LACK OF QUALITY CONTROL COSTS INDUSTRY BILLIONS

Paris LES ECHOS in French 6 Jul 83 p 8

[Article by Jean Deflacheliere]

[Text] With direct and indirect taxes, welfare contributions, and financial costs, enterprises miss no opportunity to deplore, through the voice of their highest representatives, the weight of the manifold burdens they bear. By contrast, a study made at the request of the Ministry of Research and Industry has just brought to light another burden, this one borne in silence by most entrepreneurs. A millstone of considerable economic weight lies round the neck of small and medium industries, and nowhere but on their own management can they place responsibility for it.

The "non-quality" of their products causes construction and other industries to lose between Fr 100 and 105 billion yearly. That is about 4.2 percent of their revenue or, in other words, a sum approximately equal to their gross margin. The authors of the report even speak of lost earnings totaling Fr 270 billion for the national economy as a whole, a sum equal to receipts from the added value tax.

Although all industrialists have always known they must pay the price of non-quality--even while thinking, very often, that quality would cost them still more--this study, conducted by the French Association of Quality Controllers and the Guild of Expert and Certified Accountants, has the merit of resulting for the first time in a credible calculation of those costs. It is in fact based on estimates by 127 representative French enterprises of small and medium size. More than three fourths of them responded to questions asked, on the word of their cost analysts.

The "average" firm which emerges from that poll numbers 479 employees and earnings of Fr 145 million. Non-quality costs it--in expenses discernible in accounting terms--Fr 6,158,000 yearly, that is, 9.7 percent of its added value, or Fr 12,860 per employee. Abnormalities (rejections, adjustments, refunds, etc.) account for 61 percent of expenses, while sums allocated to the quality function (personnel, control systems, etc.) represent but 39 percent of expenditures.

In that regard, AFQ president Pierre Lemaitre considers that "a 10 percent increase in resources devoted to quality would suffice to reduce costs of abnormalities by 40 percent." The balance sheet would then show annual savings of Fr 20 billion by industry and construction, not counting gains difficult to measure which would result, both abroad and on our domestic market, from an improved hallmark reputation.

For his part, Jacques Repussart, head of the industrial products quality division of the Ministry for Research and Industry, takes satisfaction in "now having available an objective element to use in convincing heads of enterprise to integrate the quality factor into their strategy." Action by public authorities in this domain, moreover, will be reoriented on the basis of the report submitted to the Minister of Industry and the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] by M Vincent, deputy general manager of CIT-Alcatel. It strongly recommends a threefold awareness campaign directed at heads of enterprises, who are invited to join together in regional groups; at nationalized firms, which are asked to help their subcontractors in the struggle for quality; and at consumers, who are to be urged by televised appeals in early fall to be more exacting.

Quality Centers Mushrooming

Over 4,000 quality centers are already operating in 640 firms employing approximately 10 percent of French wage earners. Following its fourth conference, AFCERQ [French Association of Quality Centers] has all the more reason to be proud of its record, since it started operations barely two years ago, when the quality movement was virtually nonexistent.

Today it is growing like wildfire, and AFCERQ records no fewer than 470 additional groups ready to begin operations in the next few months. It even expects to mark the advent of the 10,000th group by year's end.

Despite appearances, that prediction is quite realistic, for many enterprises seem determined to generalize, with 10 or several times that number of centers, the experiment they had prudently begun with but one or two groups.

6145

CSO: 3519/571

UNOSTRA, FNTR AT ODDS OVER TRANSPORTATION REFORMS

Paris LES ECHOS in French 6 Jul 83 p 9

[Article by Gilles Bridier]

[Text] One can hardly make head or tail of it. Yesterday some truckers reproached Transportation Minister Charles Fiterman for driving them to the wall by wanting to go too fast with regulatory reform. Today other truckers are pressing the minister to speed up implementation of commitments already made so as to complete the reforms.

But yesterday it was the FNTR [National Road Transport Federation] which sought to hobble the ministry's project. This federation includes nearly three fourths of all enterprises, among them the most powerful firms--called "financial companies" by UNOSTRA [National Union of Road Transport Labor Organizations], another professional trade union group which is in the minority and primarily defends the interests of small enterprises.

And it is UNOSTRA which is today alerting its troops against "possible political collusion between the Ministry of Transportation and representatives of powerful firms" which would have the unfortunate tendency to seek delay in absorbing subcontractors; and considering that attitude as one of the major causes of deterioration of the market and non-compliance with regulations in the public interest.

But why on earth should Charles Fiterman be seen as a minister who would consent to delay reform, when he has taken on as one of his particular causes the abolition of a sub-proletariat, which grew out of the development of a disguised wage-earning class, in the road transport sector? Because of the road transport affiliates of the SNCF [French National Railways], particularly including SCETA [Secondary Transport Management and Development Company] and Bourget-Montreuil, which largely rely on subcontracting, and which, since they belong to SNCF, would compel the minister to slow the pace of his reforms.

Clearly, the pitch is rising.

We see emerging here the terms of a well known polemic. And UNOSTRA goes further. It denounces vehicle rentals which allow road transport regulations to be evaded, and calls for provisions greatly reducing consecutive rentals.

And who is causing UNOSTRA all this trouble? The large transport firms which "have above all a financial character, and for which transportation is secondary," and which by their practices would threaten the small and medium enterprises in the sector, because certain of those small and medium enterprises would come into their schemes. Is that masochism on their part? No, it's just that wage earners mistakenly catapulted into positions as heads of enterprises lack management capacities.

How is that situation to be remedied, except perhaps by temporarily blocking access to the profession of transporter, as UNOSTRA proposes timidly and in very careful language. Its reservations are understandable, for that much protectionism, even if temporary, is hardly suited to defenders of liberalism, though the members of that labor federation consider they are simply dealing with a concrete, pinpointed and precise situation.

At least UNOSTRA does put its finger on three points: exploitation of some transportation enterprises by others; a certain deftness in bending regulations; and the need for reforms prompt enough to bring order to the industry.

Such talk sounds like a declaration of war on the FNTR. And, though the minister is somewhat on the carpet, it offers Charles Fiterman backing, in fact, for speeding his ministry's action in certain directions.

A hornets' nest is indeed stirred up here. For the minister might well take matters in stride and change the whole pace and orientation of reform, even as regards controls, public-interest regulations, etc. The risk is that of a boomerang effect, as it were, on an industry whose unity is made fragile by long-standing splits.

6145

CSO: 3519/571

STATE SECTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR 60 PERCENT OF FOREIGN DEBT

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Horacio Piriquito]

[Text] These huge public charges represent approximately 60 percent of Portugal's total foreign debt. As is commonly known, this debt reached \$13.162 billion (more than 1.5 billion contos) last December. It is estimated that Portugal's total foreign debt now already totals \$15 billion.

According to data now made public by the Secretariat of State for Planning, the total foreign debt of the many public non-financial firms that make up the state's enterprise sector (SEE) reached \$7.52 billion (about 900 million contos) at the end of last year. Seventy percent of this amount are demand short term loans.

In addition to the amounts owed by the SEE, Portugal's foreign debt--proportionally one of the largest and most dangerous in the world--also has the following components: direct public debt, \$2,856 billion; Bank of Portugal, \$670 million; other monetary and non-monetary institutions, \$1,262 billion; private non-financial sector, \$854 million.

These figures are much more compromising and worrisome because the same Secretariat of State for Planning (Central Planning Department) study shows the SEE only employs 209,000 people (116,000 in transportation alone) working in 57 enterprises when Portugal's total active population is 4.5 million people.

In fact, to have 209,000 people responsible for 60 percent of one of the most worrisome foreign debts in the world appears to be an exaggeration and a more than sufficient reason to justify the most drastic measures any government would have the courage to carry out.

The foreign debt incurred by the public enterprises are also related to our foreign debt component, the total amount of which underwent more abrupt (and incomprehensible) increases in the last 5 years. The SEE in effect quickly reached \$7.52 billion in 1982 (it was responsible for \$2,856 billion in 1979) and it does not appear to be too difficult to foresee that this figure will have surpassed \$9 billion in the first half of 1983.

As for the matter of employment in the state enterprise sector, the 209,000 workers mentioned above are divided into the following categories: industry, 57,000; electric energy, 19,000; transportation and communications, 116,000 and other sectors, 17,000.

All these figures are insignificant when compared with the total Portuguese active population (as we reported, it is approximately 4.5 million people). There are 310,000 unemployed people or 7.2 percent, which is curiously one of the lowest rates of the developing countries or even the more industrialized ones.

It should be underscored that curiously the unemployment rate in Portugal appears to be at a first glance the only economic indicator that "looks good" in the current period of domestic recession. Nevertheless, given the inevitable economic hibernation we will go through in the next few years aimed at reducing our current account balance, we can easily expect that the unemployment rate will increase to double the current figures.

Agriculture, fishing and industry absorb by themselves 2 million of the approximately 4 million workers who are employed. Construction: 407,000 workers; commerce, restaurants and hotels: 493,000; transportation, warehousing and communications: 163,000; and public administration, defense and health and education services: 427,000 absorb the remainder.

As you can see by these figures, the number of Portuguese civil servants totalled 427,000 at the end of last year. This represents an increase of 74,000 since 1979, that is, during the last 5 years.

EXTERNAL DEBT
(external debt in millions of dollars)

	1979		1980		1981		1982	
	Medium & Longterm		Medium & Longterm		Medium & Longterm		Medium & Longterm	
Direct public--								
1276 debt	1,276	1,276	1,691	1,691	2,195	2,195	2,856	2,856
Bank of Portugal	1,617	1,035	1,116	396	962	612	670	550
Other institutions (monetary & nonmonetary)	430	430	575	574	728	708	1,262	1,212
Non-financial public enterprises	2,856	1,996	3,677	2,138	5,342	2,633	7,520	4,019
Non-financial private sector	405	328	621	453	776	551	854	726
TOTAL	6,584	5,065	7,680	5,752	10,003	6,799	13,162	9,363

EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR
(in thousands)

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
Employment	198	204	205	205	209
Industry	50	52	53	55	57
Electric energy	15	17	18	18	19
Transportation and Communications	118	118	117	115	116
Other sectors	15	17	17	17	17

9935

CSO: 3542/182

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS--According to a study done by the National Institute of Statistics [INE], the unemployment rate in Portugal is around 7.5 percent of the active population. In continental Portugal alone, the number of unemployed was 321,000 during the second half of 1982. The number of unemployed people for the same period in 1981 was 325,000 (7.6 percent). This study, which the INE made public yesterday, reports that, for the first time since 1976, those searching for new employment comprise the largest section of the [un]employed. During the second half of 1982, 53 percent of the unemployed were searching for new employment while 47 percent were searching for their first job. Despite the fact that women (68.2 percent in overall terms) as well as young people who are less than 25 years of age (65.4 percent) are the most affected by unemployment, the unemployment rate among women decreased by 7 percent when compared to 1981. The unemployment rate among women was 12.1 percent in the second half of 1982 as opposed to 12.3 percent in 1981. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate among men continues to decline--4.1 percent in 1982 and 4.2 percent in 1981. [Excerpt] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 5] 9935

CSO, 3542/182

PIPE FACTORY DIRECTOR ON INDUSTRY'S ROLE IN POLLUTION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Jul 83 p 3

[Interview with Mannesman-Sumerbank Pipe Factory director Ibrahim Aldemir by Tulay Filiz: "Industry Is Not Solely Responsible For Sea of Marmara Pollution;" date and place of interview not given.]

[Text] Mannesman Factory director Ibrahim Aldemir stated that acid, which is their only product that could be a source of environmental pollution, is dumped into a stone quarry to protect the environment. "Industry does not bear sole responsibility for polluting the Sea of Marmara," he said. Director Aldemir of the Mannesman-Sumerbank Pipe Factory, one of the enterprises held responsible for polluting the Sea of Marmara, defended the company saying that no dangerous factory wastes are dumped into the sea.

Mannesman-Sumerbank Pipe Factory director, Ibrahim Aldemir, answered DUNYA's questions as follows:

DUNYA: What do you think about the state of the Sea of Marmara. Given that there is severe pollution, what do you think should be done to save the sea?

Aldemir: Investments for clean-up operations are generally rather large. And of course, there is no profit. Given this, you cannot expect industrial enterprises to be volunteers in this matter. Government pressure is needed; there should be stiff sanctions including factory closure as is done in other countries. A solution for the considerable burden that clean-up operations place on enterprises could work like this: Every firm would set aside a fund for this purpose; a portion of annual profits would be applied to this. At first, perhaps the state could assist with an incentive credit, then these activities would be promoted from these funds.

For years, state officials in Izmir have pursued this matter very closely. Our provincial governors have always dealt with this subject scrupulously. In recent years, too, there has been public interest nurtured by the press. It is not now a case of public indifference as it was 10 years ago. All Izmit residents know about sea and air pollution. Public opinion is set against it. Now no industrialist can be complacent as was the case in the past. All of them have to take measures, but people should not expect results right away. Even if pollution were reduced to nothing, cleaning up the sea would be a long-term process.

DUNYA: Do you think that industry is solely responsible for pollution of the Marmara?

Aldemir: Definitely not. There is a second matter that needs to be examined-- bilge water dumped from ships. This activity should be vigorously prosecuted. A 1000 Turkish lira fine cannot halt it. Then there is the drainage runoff problem caused by concentrated development. This is a major threat to all coastlines. Industry has been brought into line but nothing is being done on these two questions. Water flow should be determined through meteorological research and they should see to it that dirty water drained into the sea is drained into regions where there is good current flow.

I would especially like to say that Turkey is one of the countries which very early on has moved on the environmental pollution question. Countries such as the U.S. and Great Britain, countries whose industry developed long before ours, have only now taken up this problem. Public and press reaction is now being felt. Worldwide, clean-up technology for dangerous substances recently has begun to develop. Yet, still unknown are the processes through which many substances are rendered harmless.

12280

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MARTENS DEFENDS ROLE OF SPECIAL POWERS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 23 Jul 83 pp 20-24

[Interview with Wilfried Martens, Belgian prime minister, by Rene de Bok:
"Between Dictatorship and Democracy"]

[Excerpt] [De Bok] "What has been gained from the 'special powers' since they were invoked in early 1982?"

[Martens] "The enormous advantage conferred by the special powers was already evident in 1982. During that time, we enacted 192 decrees with these powers, thereby sparing the Parliament 5 years of work. The issue affects two areas. On the one hand, we have restored the Belgian economy's competitiveness. We have abandoned our system of automatic indexing, the adjustment of wages to price trends. Between June 1982 and the beginning of 1984, 23 introduced a system based on a flat sum rather than on percentages. Indexing is restricted to the minimum wage, 30,000 Belgian francs. Everyone gets the same indexing regardless of earnings, namely, 600 francs. This has strengthened the position of Belgian businesses. There is agreement on this point not only here at home but also within the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. Using the forecasts for 1983 and 1984 we asked ourselves what the labor cost trends are for our seven major trade partners. In order of importance, they are Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Great Britain, the United States and Japan. The current forecast indicates an average increase in labor costs of 6.5 percent. Here it is only 5.3 percent. In 1984, we will closely approach the European average but not exceed it. It is most certain that we will succeed in insuring an abiding competitive edge for the Belgian economy. This is reflected in the balance of trade and the stability of our currency, which has improved greatly. Secondly, we have used the special powers to ameliorate the budget situation and to bring our social insurance system into financial balance. We have one of the largest financial deficits in Western Europe, maybe even the largest. It amounts to 13 percent of the GNP at the national level and for all levels, including the regions and municipalities, it is 16.5 percent. We reduced this to 16 percent in 1982. It is evident, however, that there will be some delay in realizing this program. The Supreme Council for Finance has

judged that a rapid reduction of the financial deficit is not feasible. I can report that we have definitively brought the deficit to a halt. In 1984 we should be able to bring it down to 10 percent."

[De Bok] "Initially the plans were considerably more ambitious. There was even mention of a deficit reduction to 7 percent."

[Martens] "Aside from the national revenue problems, the financial crisis has three aspects: the area of municipal finances--Luik and Antwerp are spectacular examples here--the area of welfare programs, and the national sector. The last concerns those branches of industry in which the government is involved. The most obvious is the crisis of steel in the Walloon region. The problem of public finances is present not only at the national level but at the regional and municipal levels as well. Then there is still another complication. This is the fact that Belgium has a system with an enormous feudality.

"The central government has allowed the municipalities a large measure of autonomy. This is what I call feudality. I have determined that the measures we have taken in the public sector are much less efficient than are the decisions taken in the program of industrial economic rehabilitation. If we had attained the same degree of efficiency in dealing with the universities, the school system, health insurance, to mention a few, we would now have a deficit of less than 10 percent. But that's not the case because things move much more slowly. People say that the Dutch are great planners. I would say that the Belgians are great schemers. They don't care a hoot for the public sector. For centuries, our people have lived under foreign occupation. It became a national trait that everyone has his scheme for steering clear of the authorities. The individual comes first. This also characterizes our administrations, whether it is the municipal administration or that of the university, railroad or health insurance. There is the same mentality everywhere, and the plans are at cross purposes. It takes much longer to reform these sectors. This explains the paradoxical situation where we have been able to increase the competitiveness of the economy but are still struggling with problems in the area of public finances."

[De Bok] "The parties out of power criticize your policy as pro business."

[Martens] "I know. But we had to restore the financial structure of businesses. The question to ask is: What are businesses doing now? The figures appear to be better than the European average. Belgium is no longer the sick man of Europe. Government policy has also stimulated job creation. My primary goal is to stabilize unemployment by 1984. Since the crisis began, an average of 35,000 jobs have been lost each year in the private sector. And each year, 20,000 to 25,000 young people appear on the labor market looking for work. That's why we had at a given time over a half million unemployed. At present, unemployment is stationary in Belgium. But seasonal work has something to do with that. In 1984, we will attain genuine stability. Even if the economy doesn't pick up, we can stabilize unemployment next year."

[De Bok] "What is the role of the trade unions while the special powers are in effect?"

[Martens] "Now that is the miracle of Belgium. Just as in your country as well as in others, the crisis didn't really get started until 1974. I experienced its gradual development from 1972 on as chairman of the Christian People's Party. From 1974 on, no agreement was reached between the social partners as had been the case before in Belgium. The so-called interprofessional agreements were made earlier. I tried that as well. I was able to conclude a limited agreement only in 1981. You could say that the Belgian governments were totally paralyzed for 8 years, not daring to intervene for fear of social disturbances. The miracle that took place is that we broke a number of taboos. One of the most important was automatic indexing. This happened without any social disturbances to speak of. There were some demonstrations. There were strikes. But all of these were failures. Despite what people say, we did maintain a dialogue with the trade unions at all times. The difference is that we kept up the dialogue then, but now the government ultimately makes the decision. In earlier situations--before this government--they kept in continuous touch with the union and conducted a dialogue, but there was never any decision that resulted from it. In those years, Belgium was more of a "unionocracy" than a democracy. If we worked with the normal parliamentary procedure, and the decisions had to pass the Chamber and Senate, there would still be the danger that these decisions would then be modified by the negotiators of the social partners so that the decisions would no longer have any meaning. After deliberation on welfare matters, the special powers enable the government to say: 'We have heard your positions; we have tried to come to an agreement, but it is not possible or not totally satisfactory. We will now render a decision.' This is no longer simply theory in Belgium. It is a reality. There is discussion for a while, and then the government can make a decision and enact a royal decree."

[De Bok] "There are very attractive aspects to this way of cutting the knots and getting things done. But isn't there the danger that Belgium is entering the twilight zone between democracy and dictatorship?"

[Martens] "This is not at all true. Our Council of State, the body which reviews the constitutionality of decisions, has found the special powers to be in perfect accord with the Constitution. Article 78 states in so many words that the King--that is to say, the government--possesses no powers other than those granted by the Constitution and specific legislation. The Council of State has fully legitimized the special powers. In addition, we are under the permanent supervision of the Parliament. People imagine that the Parliament can be sent on vacation now that we have the special powers. The fact is that we can be corrected at any time. Even in the areas that the government now controls, the Parliament can render decisions independently, if it desires. So our situation should not be compared with the presidential authority that, say France has."

[De Bok] "Maybe the Parliament hasn't been sent on vacation, but it can't be denied that the popular representation has had to surrender its function temporarily as the government's supervisory power."

[Martens] "This function of the Parliament is still intact. With the understanding that the Parliament can no longer control all the details. Let me illustrate by relating the course of events concerning the law extending compulsory education. After 30 years of discussion in Belgium, the limit was set at 18. It was 14 years of age before. I see the role of Parliament this way: the Parliament must make the principle decision--the extension of the compulsory education age to 18--whereas the government settles all the details surrounding it. In my opinion, that is the role of the Parliament in this time of crisis. The Parliament makes the fundamental decisions; it determines the basic options and debates them for a week, if need be. This doesn't bother me. I had to sit in Parliament for 2 months to get the special powers. I don't think that's bad as long as there's the understanding that, when the vote has been taken at the end of the debate, the government must then be able to take action. There must then be an end to the talking."

[De Bok] "The system of the Parliament making the political decisions and the administration assuming responsibility for their execution was violated by the elimination of automatic indexing of wages and prices."

[Martens] "That is correct. The trouble in Belgium is that even that decision virtually couldn't be made by the Parliament. This is a sure sign that something is wrong. Normally, the Parliament would be able to make such a decision. As far as indexing, the decision had to be made by the administration because we saw no chance that it would be settled by the Parliament."

[De Bok] "Do you think that this method of governing is perhaps the most appropriate for Belgium? Would you advocate that this method be institutionalized rather than treated as an exception, as is now the case?"

[Martens] "In our constitutional monarchy, that is impossible. The special powers cannot be invoked except for limited purposes and for a limited period of time. For their continuance, the Constitution would have to be revised."

[De Bok] "Is it possible that it will be necessary to rule by decree in 1984 too?"

[Martens] "Yes, but that's a different matter. I want to give the parliamentary model another chance. But that depends on two conditions. One is that an absolute distinction be drawn between the national and the regional mandate. I was elected a member of the Chamber as a popular representative from the Gent-Eeklo district but I am also a member of the Flemish Council. I am therefore a member of both the national and the

regional parliaments. That is the case with most popular representatives and it's an unhealthy situation. The second condition is that a fundamental difference must be drawn between options and execution of legislation. If the Parliament insists on being involved in the working out of detailed policy, you will see the governments that succeed me take refuge in the special powers. That's my prediction. Under normal circumstances, when there is no crisis, I would advocate a return to the parliamentary model. But then the Parliament has to resume its activities in a thorough fashion. The Parliament would have to come to grips with what's going on in society. The major task confronting modern parliamentary democracy in the coming decades is seizing the opportunity to set the major social goals. That is the function of Parliament in a totally changed picture of society. That picture is undergoing complete change, regardless of how long the Parliament might debate in the Paleis der Naties. No one can deny that society is changing. It's time that our parliamentarians find this out."

We spoke about the slowness of the democratic process in the Netherlands, where there is great readiness to talk, but very little ability to make decisions. Parliamentary debate about possible heavier taxes for people with two incomes has been put off again for months. Martens was very surprised and remarked: "Yes, see, that doesn't happen to us anymore."

He revealed that he was slightly hurt by the disapproving descriptions provoked by his recourse to the special powers--epithets such as "political terrorism," "enlightened despots," "dictatorship." Says Martens: "The vocabulary used by these critics is certainly not delicate. And maybe it's not democratic. I still say that Belgium is probably in many respects the most democratic country in the world...."

Martens complained: "People in the Netherlands don't realize what it takes to arrive at decisions in Belgium, to reach a consensus of at least 15 ministers. It's always an enormous job to get a consensus between the Walloons and the Flemish. In this regard, we are a handicapped country."

The invalid character of Belgium stands in stark contrast with the political agility of the Martens Government. All eyes are on Belgium, on this twilight zone between enlightened "dictatorship" and democracy, on the special powers and on the supernatural vigor of a driven prime minister who wants to rescue his country from the *cul de sac* of nations. So far, all indications point to Wilfried Martens' success in doing this.

9992

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ENCLAVED CYPRIOT ON RELATIONS WITH TURKISH NEIGHBORS

Athens ANDI in Greek No 237, 22 Jul 83 pp 31-32

[Article by Stelios Kouloglou]

[Text] Rizokarpason is a small village on the northern edge of Cyprus which was full of life before the Turkish invasion. It was a Greek Cypriot village. Of its 2,500 inhabitants, 600 refused to become refugees. Another 250 inhabitants of Gialousa, another village further south, did the same thing. These 850 people are today the enclaved in occupied territory.

We had the opportunity to talk with one of them. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the 850 Greek Cypriots, a great majority of whom are old people, are the last breeding-ground of resistance to the occupation. Despite the--justified--effort of our fellow-converser to avoid references to the "bad situations" and cruelties, the news about the way of life is disturbing: the forced labor, the "hellenization" of settlers from the depths of the East, the "secret school" for Greek children and the desperate hope for liberation.

For understandable reasons, any parts of the discussion which could "betray" the identity of the enclaved person who had the courage to speak have been left out.

Question: Well, what is happening down there?

Answer: We are better now. They got used to and learned the language, we all started work.

Question: What, you mean to say that the Turks learned Greek?

Answer: Yes, they learned Greek and we are all getting along.

Question: Let us take things from the beginning. How did this happen?

Answer: In the beginning we did not know the language. They were prejudiced, thinking we are murderers, we are peasants and wild creatures, whereas later they calmed down.... Concerning the language, I believe it is a natural thing. Someone who goes to a country, to a place, will be forced to learn the native language.

Question: It is not always so.

Answer: Why?

Question: It is because the Greeks have more of an influence. You cannot possibly condescend to learn Turkish.

Answer: No, if we went to Turkey, we would learn Turkish.

Question: Why, did the English ever learn a word of Greek?

Answer: The English were different. Because they came as conquerors. They did not condescend to synchronize themselves with us, that is the reason.

Question: Whereas the Turks?

Answer: They come from a backwards country. To explain this to you, I will tell you a conversation I had with my Turkish neighbor. They assigned them many goods and houses and fields and water and yards and carobs and olives. They came for this. In Turkey they did not have a piece of land. If they had any house. And they were working for pashas. At the beginning when they came here they stole, but even now they are not contented. Nor do they have much property. A family which has five or six children was not given enough property. And they complain. Also they did not issue them enough food. In the beginning, a little oil, a little flour. And so they began to work. But when the bad weather came, as it came last year, we did not produce olives, we did not produce carobs, they had nothing. And to buy, they have to pay. Where could they find the money? They cannot work at outside jobs because each has his field. And as long as he has no money, he is unable to live as he should.

Question: That is, you Greeks have more money?

Answer: But we have pensions, we have allowances, every week we have an allotment of wheat, they bring us clothes and shoes. We have no economic problems, none. And one who has the strength--because we old people stayed here--and has a few chickens, a few goats, a flock of 150 sheep, does quite well....

Question: They let you cultivate the fields?

Answer: As long as it is property, they allow it. We plant whatever we need.

Question: Are you able to do business?

Answer: To sell, what would we sell? We buy the things we need. Clothes, for example.

Question: You all go to shop at Varosia?

Answer: Yes.

Question: You have gone to Varosia?

Answer: I do not have any business there.

Question: You all go whenever you wish or do you have to have some purpose?

Answer: To go, you have to tell the police, "Tomorrow, you know, I will go to Varosia." You show your ID card, nothing else. A bus goes to Varosia, Venizelos goes, his car is small, once a week. But there is a Turkish one which goes every day and you can go with the Turks.

Forced Labor

Question: They say that lately they have put the men to forced labor.

Answer: Let me tell you this. Every Friday, once a week, the Greek men aged 18 to 50 go and say "present" to the police. And when they say present and the station yard needs cleaning, it has weeds, cigarette butts, they do the cleaning. That is it. Some act displeased and the police may beat them. We also have our insubordinates.

Question: In the beginning it was quiet? The Turks did not steal?

Answer: We said they stole.

Question: Why did you stay down there in Karpas [peninsula]? You did not have time to leave or you wanted to stay?

Answer: We did not want to leave; no one could so easily abandon his belongings, his origin, to leave.

Question: Not even with the danger you saw?

Answer: Those who left, it was because when they took the prisoners and took the belongings, many prisoners did not come back. They remained away from here. And the families were forced to come.

The "Secret School"

Question: What are the problems you face?

Answer: A big problem is the school. There is only a primary school. If a child wants to go to high school, he cannot. The Turks do not allow a high school.

Question: They told us that at the school, when they celebrate on 25 March and 28 October, they cannot fly the Greek flag. And the little ones draw a Greek flag on the blackboard with chalk....

Answer: The little ones have a clear conscience. The teachers in the school here do a good job.

Question: So they celebrate the same holidays at school as we celebrate?

Answer: Yes, of course, they celebrate and make parades. They do whatever they can. The teachers tell them about the holiday, about the differences. Their conviction is that they are Greeks....

Question: Do you go to church? You have marriages, feasts?

Answer: Very few marriages. We do not go to church at night.

Question: Why not at night?

Answer: I should leave my house empty?

Question: But you said things are going well now, they do not bother you....

Answer: Many times, at our own times, they broke into the houses. Many times when they thought there was no owner in the house they broke into a house to steal. Our own, not now, but before.

Question: Is there an army in the village now?

Answer: No, there is the police. There is an army only at Apostolos Andreas.

Question: Are there Turkish Cypriots also?

Answer: Residents? No. There are in Gialousa. The Koltsiniates went, from Kolt-sina. They come and bring us different things. They have cars and they do business. We have a cooperative grocery.

End of the Enclaved

Question: How many students does the school have now?

Answer: I do not know if the school has about 50 now. For all classes, from first to sixth. Both male and female. Because those who can work and had the problem of the children left with the whole family. Few stayed. The old people do not have children. Mainly the old people. There would have been 200 or so. Now that some have died and others, their children came and they left, 120 of us pensioners 65 and over would be left.

Question: And how many are you all together?

Answer: All together, not less than 600. At the time of the invasion we had nearly 2,500. Not counting the enlisted men who they held and the others....

Question: So, as you say, they all need a little time to leave. How much do you think? A year?

Answer: I suppose a year is enough when things are not busy.

Hope

Question: Do you believe things will change?

Answer: I will tell you what I believe. I am not vain or pessimistic. I always have hope about everything. Until I see something inevitable. But I find that we do not have a perspective, or a unity. We suffer like Judas who betrayed Jesus for money. That is, money or positions, at any rate, entice us. And for this reason, I find that we suffer so many bad things. Despite all this, I believe they will be forced to leave.

Question: How can they leave, since the children who were born and have grown up here think Karpas is their homeland?

Answer: International law says this. They are settlers, they came through violence. They are conquerors. If our great ones applaud and do not confront such situations, it will not take long for the Organization to be dissolved. The great ones place the small ones and meddle. The small ones do not have any knowledge or sense of what is happening because they are working for foreign interests. It is nationalism which harms us all first and foremost. In any case, I believe something will happen.

Question: What will happen?

Answer: Maybe an agreement.

Question: What agreement? The Turks agree for the refugees to go back?

Answer: Maybe you do not know how the Israelites left Mount Sinai. There was an agreement. The settlers were forced to leave. We are talking about something which formed an agreement and happened.

Question: But what agreement would the Turks make? It is a 10-mile place. Do they have room to make an agreement?

Answer: You can ask a politician that.

9247

CSO: 3521/391

FDP'S MORLOK ON COALITION, RELATIONS WITH CSU

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 29 Jul 83 p 22-23

[Report on interview with Juergen Morlok, Baden-Wuerttemberg state chairman and party vice-chairman of FDP [the Free Democratic Party], by editors Ralf-Dieter Brunowsky and Armin Mahler: "Swallowing a Toad"; date of interview not given]

[Text] In a discussion with the WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, Juergen Morlok, state chairman and party vice-chairman of the FDP, assesses the constant pressure of the CSU [Christian Social Union] on his party as an attempt to squash the liberal partner in the coalition.

[Question] Mr Morlok, inside the Bonn coalition the FDP is being pushed increasingly into a corner. When will the liberals reach their pain threshold?

[Morlok] Impressions are deceptive. The coalition is producing considerable sound effects at the moment, to be sure. But the FDP is putting into practice what it agreed to in the coalition negotiations. To be sure, we had to swallow a toad in the coalition negotiations in the matter of the reintroduction of breach of peace. But the amendment to the anticontact law [Kontaktsperregesetz] we got through constitutes a progressive constitutional reform.

[Question] When will the next toad come along?

[Morlok] In this coalition the FDP has taken over a constitutional braking function. We won't go along with any retrogression on Paragraph 218 nor any legal prohibition of passive armament and disguise. We are of the opinion that the existing laws are fully sufficient. They need only be enforced resolutely.

[Question] How are such declarations of intent to be carried through in the coalition?

[Morlok] The coalition has agreed to work without varying majorities. If no agreement is reached between the coalition party groups, a bill cannot be passed.

[Question] --then unless to use the right to demonstrate, Interior Minister Zimmermann threatens again to vote the FDP down by a majority vote in the cabinet.

[Morlok] A majority of the cabinet does not by any means amount to a majority in the German Parliament. If that is supposed to be the new device in this coalition, it needs to be asked how it expects to rule rationally for the next three and a half years. Moreover, the CDU also has to watch out that it doesn't lose its middle-class voting blocs because the CSU faction of the Union is pursuing a policy which cannot benefit the whole Union.

[Question] At least it can't benefit the success of the coalition group FDP, if Friedrich Zimmermann puts through environmental protection measures faster than his predecessor Gerhart Baum can demand them.

[Morlok] That party's recipe for success consists in the fact that it has no difficulty at all in speaking in ideologically embattled tones on the one hand and acting thoroughly pragmatically on the other. That's why it was no problem for the CSU to condemn financial benefits to the GDR as one-sided advance concessions a year ago and to characterize the GDR credit as a necessity of national policy today. And that's why the CSU had no difficulty in criticizing the environmental policies of Mr Baum as employment killing and today selling the same policies as the future of the economy.

[Question] Where does that leave the FDP?

[Morlok] The FDP has to learn from this to push the coalition forward even faster in the field of environmental protection. It musn't let itself be confused by Mr Zimmermann.

[Question] Such status-gaining and differentiating exercises don't necessarily get across the image of a functioning coalition.

[Morlok] The advantage of this coalition is that it has a broad majority of the populace behind it, which has credited it with competence to solve the problems in the fields which are causing citizens the greatest worries today. Its difficulty consists in the fact that the CSU still hasn't grasped the fact that a coalition set up for the longer term can't be maintained if one partner tries to drive the other into a corner. The coalition still has to learn to attack one or another problem with more imperturbability and not to push one or another partner to the wall with hectic attempts at mutual differentiation--let alone destroy its identity.

[Question] And the CSU is trying to do that?

[Morlok] It has become obvious lately that the CSU at present is trying all it can to put the FDP under pressure. And when I take a closer look at Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister-President Lothar Spaeth's promised initiative in the Upper House on the subject of disguise and passive armament, I get the impression that here a part of the CDU is trying along with the CSU to squash the liberal partner in the coalition.

[Question] Zimmermann is pursuing internal policies, and Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg is pursuing budget consolidation--the decisive reason for the change of partners by the liberals. What does that leave for the FDP?

[Morlok] The change of coalition automatically produces a repositioning of the FDP in the spectrum of parties. In the field of economic and finance policy the FDP can no longer differentiate itself so strongly as in the old coalition, because now the fundamental tones of the coalition parties are alike.

[Question] So much alike that the credit for consolidating the budget all falls to Stoltenberg.

[Morlok] The FDP mustn't make the mistake of becoming the troublemaker in the coalition just to differentiate itself. It has to make its position plain where it is necessary to show its true colors: In the constitutional domain as the driving force and in the domain of foreign affairs and detente policy as a force that ensures continuity. But where harmonies are present, it is not necessary to intentionally look for positions of delimitation.

[Question] And how do you intend to get the voters who will assure the survival of the FDP in the future?

[Morlok] For more than ten years the FDP has had no body of committed voters who would basically assure it of passing the five percent hurdle. We've always been dependent on the fact that voters are ready for functional reasons to give us their vote, in order--for example in Hessen--to bring about a government capable of functioning. And we need independent voters who vote for the FDP for very definite objective political reasons, for example as protector and guardian of freedom.

[Question] Where do you intend to find these voters?

[Morlok] For the coming years the FDP has to keep an eye on the economically independent citizen, but also the skilled worker, the white-collar worker, and the civil servant. Particularly in the present coalition, the FDP must also appeal more strongly again to the young generation through high sensitivity toward policies ranging from peace to environment. A liberal party has a potential public that can certainly come up to 20 percent.

[Question] In Hessen on 25 September a full 5 percent would be enough for you. But according to polls and FDP support there is between 3 and 4 percent.

[Morlok] I regard the prospects for success in Hessen as extremely good. The FDP in Hessen has recovered, its personality conflicts have been cleared up, and it will fight a united election campaign.

[Question] Can the FDP really achieve its needed reorientation with the present leadership team?

[Morlok] I am convinced that the FDP can present its program convincingly with its offering of candidates, not only at the federal but also increasingly at the state level. The FDP has gotten back into step in the states. Here the FDP is going through a change of generations which has not occurred yet in the other parties. In recent months 5 state chairmen have been elected who are all about 40 years old.

[Question] And at the federal level?

[Morlok] We need no discussion of personalities at the federal level, and we're not going to be talked into one. We have an elected federal chairman who has led the FDP successfully and with great persuasive power through a hard election campaign, who previously, to be sure, had made a highly controversial decision in the party...

[Question] ...and who is therefore rumored to be tired of office. And his potential successor, Count Otto Lambsdorff, is threatened with prosecution in the Flick affair.

[Morlok] In the case of Count Lambsdorff we have just seen once more how rumors on the pattern of political slander are put about, only to have to be taken back with a polite apology three days later. Even if he should be accused, he hasn't been condemned by a long shot. I believe Count Lambsdorff will survive the campaign which is being mounted against him.

[Question] As a person, or also as a cabinet minister?

[Morlok] Both. And as I said, the question of a successor doesn't arise.

[Question] For sooner or for later, you are in demand as Genscher's crown prince.

[Morlok] My mind-range perspective lies in state and municipal politics. And FDP seen only as a federal party would not be able to survive in the long run. The FDP has to have its base in the states and municipalities. Federal presence and programs alone won't do.

[Question] And in case the party should call you to the top?

[Morlok] I can't imagine that a federal party could be led from one state. Whoever leads the federal party must also be anchored in federal politics, and be at least a member of the German Parliament. As every one knows, I am a member of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state legislature. And I will run for re-election on 25 March 1984.

12428

CSO: 3620/423

POLLS SHOW RURAL PARTY PROFITING FROM CABINET PARTICIPATION

Equivalent to Six Seat Gain

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Jul 83 p 6

[Article: "Borg: Poll Shows Alienation from Big Parties; SMP Took Supporters Away from Center Party — Youth Votes Went to Greens"]

[Text] "Opinion poll results clearly show that existing pressures for change are channeled in two directions, toward the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) and the alternative party of the Greens," political science Prof Olavi Borg asserts.

"At the same time support for the political Left has dropped lower than ever since the wars, which indicates a fundamental decline of the Left.

"Opinion poll results show alienation from the traditional big party organizations. Alternative parties like the SMP and the Greens, on the other hand, are succeeding in gaining the support of people who have remained outside of politics. The number of those who do not assume political positions is decreasing," Borg said.

According to Borg, support figures for the Conservative Party, the People's Democrats and Social Democrats are still within the normal range of fluctuation, which is from a half to 1 percent. Borg feels that the fact that of these the SDP [Social Democratic Party] has lost the least amount of its support is an indication that the party's role as a government caretaker is known. "A governing party like that is generally trusted unless it 'fumbles the ball'."

From KEPU to SMP

According to the poll, the Center Party (KEPU), which Borg says lost part of its support to precisely the SMP, has lost most in terms of support. Quiet coexistence with the SMP eats away at its support all the time. The two parties will soon reach a point where they will either have to fight one another or ally themselves.

According to Borg, part of the KEPU's support base has also been absorbed by the Swedish People's Party (RKP), which has now acquired former Liberals in its ranks.

Borg believes that the SMP has gained supporters from both the Left and the Right as well as from the KEPU. "The drop in support for the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], for example, has not, however, been channeled directly into the SMP," Borg asserted.

Borg believes that the increase in support for the Greens has in part come from young people who used to vote for the KEPU and the Conservative Party. "An even greater percentage may be attributed to young people who used to stay out of politics but now dare to commit themselves to the Greens movement," Borg said.

SMP's Social Acceptability Shown

According to Borg, the poll results also show that the public approves of the SMP's joining the government. "Although the party's supporters used to support protest and opposition, they do approve of the SMP's being in the government. A great deal is expected of the party now and people's confidence in it will be measured as early as during the budget negotiations this fall," Borg believes.

According to Borg, the SMP's change from rejection to social acceptability is also evident from the poll results: Before polls have always indicated less support for the SMP than election results have. "Now people dare to say that they support the SMP," Borg said.

Fitness to Govern Has Educated the SMP

According to Prof Risto Sankiahho, the reason for the increase in support for the SMP is the fact that the party has gotten into the government, has become fit to govern. Sankiahho also said that this is the first time they have gotten SMP supporters to come out and admit it in an opinion poll, which can be explained precisely by the party's becoming fit to govern.

According to Sankiahho, the SMP's chances of overtaking the fourth largest party, the People's Democrats, depend on the disentanglement of the Communists' internal situation. Sankiahho believes that, if the Communists' internal quarrels continue, the SKDL may lose its position to the SMP.

Party	Percentage of Support for Parties		Seats in Parliament	
	Poll	Parliamentary Elections	Poll	Parliamentary Elections
SDP	26.4	26.8	7	57
Conservative Party	21.1	22.1	44	44
KEPU-Liberals	16	17.6	36 (-2)	38
SKDL	12.4	13.4	23 (-4)	27
SMP	12.2	9.7	23 (+6)	17
RKP	5.4	4.9	11	11
Greens	3.9	2	2	2
Finnish Christian League (SKL)	2.3	3	3	3
Constitutional Conservative Party (POP)	0.2	0.4	1	1
Citizens Power League (KVL)	0.1	0.1	—	—

If parliamentary elections were held now with the same election coalitions as in March, the SMP would get 23 seats all told. In comparison with the parliamentary elections, two of the six additional SMP seats would be taken away from the KEPU (in Uusimaa and Vaasa) and four from the SKDL (in the southern election districts of Turku and Hame, in Keski-Suomi and in Oulu).

The distribution of seats is calculated election district by election district by relating changes in support to support per election district and per party in the March elections.

Vaananen Attacks Role Ambivalence

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Jul 83 p 3

[Article: "Vaananen Likens It to Communists: 'The SMP Is Talking Piously About What It Will Achieve'"]

[Text] Speaking Tuesday at Suomensjarvi, KEPU vice chairwoman Marjatta Vaananen leveled sharp criticism at the SMP. In her judgment, the SMP has in the government donned the cloak of the Communists, that is, it occupies two chairs and talks piously about what it will achieve.

"As long as the SMP was in the opposition, it could in an uninhibited manner speak out against government policy and pass sentence on all those unpleasant but in terms of the economy unavoidable decisions. Now that the party occupies a responsible position in the government and has to bear the responsibility for making decisions as do the other government parties, occupying two chairs is very poorly suited to the party image. We may well ask how long the patience of those parties that bear the responsibility with such behavior will last," Vaananen remarked.

Vice chairwoman Vaananen was of the opinion that the SMP will list a large number of reforms which the party wants to carry out at the party congress to be held in less than 2 weeks time. In the same breath she said that she expected the SMP to state that the party wants to stay on in the government.

"It is self-evident that such behavior is not a fair play policy. Thus now especially is not the time for it, now when for national economy reasons we have to limit budget increases at a time when there is a really serious need for growth in certain sectors," Vaananen said.

Reasons for Advance Assessed

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Jul 83 p 2

[Editorial: "SMP Rising, Big Parties Declining"]

[Text] Surprising new pressures in party interrelations have been revealed with the shift from midsummer to August and the opening of debate on the fall budget. The magazine SEURA's latest opinion poll almost sensationally tells us of the continuing rise in support for the SMP.

As an advance payment against the success of the SMP, on Tuesday KESK vice chairwoman Marjatta Vaananen hastened to criticize this government partner of the KESK for its lack of policy line and one-sided aspirations in its own interest.

A poll conducted the M Data Center has given rise to out of the ordinary attention because data on postelection support for the parties has just not been available.

Support for the major parties has quite uniformly taken a downward turn. The decline of the SDP, the Conservative Party, the KESK and the SKDL — if the term, major party, can any longer be used with reference to the Communists — has in fact not been a big one. A drop of 1 or even 1.5 percent will not yet sway these parties. The trend is, however, an interesting one.

Climbing up in place of the big parties are now the SMP, the Greens and the KESK. What characterizes them in common is that they occupy a certain alternative position, in part also that they are present in the government or at least are participating in the business of Parliament.

The M Data Center poll has for the first time made public information on the supporters of the struggle between the KESK and the SMP. The SMP has already almost attained the level of support of the SKDL, but its support figures are no longer far from those of the combined KESK and Liberals. The difference between them is, however, still 3.8 percent, but is that a lot?

The SMP has probably garnered its increased support from several other parties. Nevertheless, it is precisely the contest between the KESK and the SMP which is going through an exciting phase. As the budget debate demonstrates, KESK and SMP views are essentially divergent from one another.

Chairman Pekka Vennamo has already challenged Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala to a contest over budget policies. It is not impossible that the younger Vennamo may later engage in a verbal battle with chairman Paavo Vayrynen. Such a contest would really be exciting, since the opinion poll published by the

Magazine APU is also worth remembering. In that one Pekka Vennamo got the best ratings for a party leader.

On the other hand, in assessing the development of support for the SMP, we have to keep our feet on the ground. The party has luckily succeeded in getting off to a promising start in the government. If, however, the SMP tries to bite off more than it can chew, the government may prove to be a bursting bubble for it. Specifically, the KEPU has probably at last perceived the danger to it that may be coming from the SMP. The SDP might not view it as a bad thing if some day there were only the SMP in the government instead of the troublesome KEPU.

For Pekka Vennamo, he is clearly aiming at more power. After all he did take part in the discussion between Paavo Vayrynen and Ilkka Suominen, announcing that a nonsocialist government can no longer be formed without the SMP.

In the fall we will see whether the big parties allow the SMP, which differs in its tactics, to permanently assume a decisive position in the domain of domestic policy.

Second Poll Confirms Trend

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 29 Jul 83 p 7

[Article: "Center Parties Would Have a Tough Fight Without Election Coalitions; SMP Would Snatch Four Seats from Center Party"]

[Text] If the changes in support indicated by the M Data Center Gallup poll were to be related to support for the parties in terms of election districts, the SMP would rise to equal standing with the KEPU and the SKDL in the new districts.

If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow without a single election coalition, the Gallup poll figures would reveal a bloody battle in the center of the party map between the KEPU, the SKL and the SMP.

The SKL would lose all three of its seats, one to the KEPU and two to the SMP. In the same crash the RKP's second seat from Helsinki would probably also be in danger and, without allies, the POP would lose its only mandate.

But above all, the SMP would thrash the KEPU by snatching at least four seats from it. Moreover, the KEPU would probably suffer defeats to the parties of the Left in the southern election district of Häme and in Lapland, among others.

A loss of 1 percent in support for the Conservative Party would mean neither one thing nor another in terms of mandates since the party now occupies "secure" seats. The same holds for the SDP's situation and, despite a 0.4-percent drop, the party would even stand a chance of gaining one more seat. Nor would the Greens have anything to worry about either — to be sure, there would be no additional seats in the offing.

The Center parties' failure to form a coalition would be the saving of the
SKL, whose support has been slipping down hill. There might not be a defeat
at all.

This is how seats would be distributed in "noncoalition" elections, with the
number of seats obtained in the March elections in parentheses: SDP 58 (57),
SKL 27 (27), Conservative Party 44 (44), KRP 35 (38), RKP 10 (11), SKL 0 (3),
SDP 24 (17), POP 0 (1), Greens 2 (2).

11,400

000: 3617/164

DUVERGER WARNS ON PROPORTIONAL VOTING, LAURENT RESUMES PCF PRESSURE

Even Partial Proportional Voting Dangerous

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Jul 83 pp 1-2

[Article by Maurice Duverger: "A British- or Italian-style Parliament?"]

[Text] Which do the French prefer: a British- or Italian-style parliament? With candidate Mitterrand having promised to introduce proportional voting in the National Assembly elections, this issue will soon be put to our fellow citizens without them even being able to respond to it themselves, since a referendum on this question is politically unlikely even though it is legally possible. It will no doubt be raised less abruptly: since the present two-round majority voting system reduces the inflexibility of the single-round system used by the British and the 47th of the "110 proposals" of 1981 could lead to a moderate dose of proportional voting for both the parliamentary and municipal elections.

The comparison with our northwestern and southeastern neighbors has the merit of certainly defining the terms of the problem and the nature of its possible solutions. Thanks to the balloting system, the bipolarization of the Fifth Republic is more flexible than that of the United Kingdom, since it pits two coalitions, and not two parties, against each other. It allows great freedom of action within each coalition, as we have observed in the case of conflicts between Chiracians and Giscardians or between communists and socialists. Nevertheless, both give voters the same privilege, at the same price. They enable them to choose the majority, the government and their common leader, and to install them for the entire legislature with the means necessary to make decisions, to judge them later with full knowledge of the facts, and finally to reelect or reject them. But at the same time, they reduce the expression of public opinion to a two-tone image in which nuances are less subtle than among the approximately 15 groups of the Weimar Reichstag, the 10 to 14 factions of the Dutch Estates General, the dozen in the Danish Folketing and Israeli Knesset, and the approximately 10 groups of our National Assembly under the Fourth Republic.

With more than 11 parties represented, the Italian Chamber of Deputies has exactly opposite advantages and drawbacks. It enables the citizens to express their moods better. It prevents them from choosing a government majority

and passes this task on to party staffs. The voters are limited to dealing the cards again. Once the process is completed, they are out of the game until the next deal, at the time of the next parliamentary elections. Coalitions are formed and dissolved without them being able to express their opinion. Although defeated and now representing less than one-third of all deputies, the Christian Democratic Party will continue to dominate future ministries, as it has dominated all previous ministries since 1945. We are still not observing in Rome what was observed in Paris prior to 1958: the same legislature shifting from right to left or from left to right between two elections, like the one which existed between Pinay and Mendes.

A Feeling of Alienation

The Italians' feeling of alienation is understandable, being confined in a system that deprives them of the possibility of choosing a policy and an administration, and changing them in the event of failure. We have experienced this wonderful system of dilution of responsibilities and omnipotence of party leaders and members. It flatters the vanity of members of parliament, to whom it gives the impression of being all-powerful. This is purely an illusory supremacy masking a practical paralysis. Fragile and divided, coalitions are incapable of decisions beyond the daily management of ordinary affairs. Almost always oriented toward the center, they encourage the development of extremist parties doomed to permanent opposition, surrounding them with an aura of intransigence and impartiality in contrast to the compromises in which members of the government get stuck.

Proportional voting works no worse in Italy than elsewhere. It has produced worse results in the Netherlands and Belgium, not to mention the Weimar Republic and the French Republic between 1946 and 1958. It works only slightly better in Denmark. However, it did not prevent the formation of stable majorities in Norway from 1945 to 1963, in Sweden from 1936 to 1976 and since 1982, in Austria from 1966 to 1983, in the FRG since 1949, and even in Greece and Spain today.

Let us eliminate these last two examples, which are too recent and too brief to be valid. All the rest have two features in common, and which are not found in our case: the absence of a communist party or its reduction to a small fringe group, and a powerful socialist party with close ties to a trade union confederation in a dominant position. This gives the left an organization that is both strong and realistic and one which prevents dissipation toward the center. In spite of everything, majorities are still at the mercy of the slightest pressure from the center. Destroyed in Oslo since 1963, in Stockholm from 1976 to 1983, in Vienna since the last elections, they were almost destroyed in 1982 in Bonn, where they are dependent on a small group which charges a very high price for its government participation.

Nostalgia

How can there be no fear that a return to proportional voting might destroy the London model in the National Assembly and establish in its place the Rome model, which took shape under the Fourth Republic and for which almost all

politicians are nostalgic? It is undoubtedly not a question of returning entirely to the pre-1958 electoral system, but only of watering down the majority vote. Some people dream merely of adding to the present 491 seats, which would remain subject to the same regulations as today, with 150 to 200 additional seats being filled by proportional voting.

This overlooks the fact that only about a hundred would have been sufficient to prevent a majority from being obtained in the 1962, 1967, 1973 and 1978 parliamentary elections, as was the case. In theory, the 1968 and 1981 elections could have achieved that despite such an addition, but they would not have succeeded in practice, since the actual votes in both cases reflected the consequences of a bipolarization imposed by the present voting system. Thus less than 17 percent of the proportional votes coupled with more than 83 percent of the majority vote would be sufficient to wipe out the stable governments which we have known for more than 20 years.

That deserves some thought before applying a Proposition 47, which not one out of 1,000 voters for Francois Mitterrand considered when he cast his vote. Some people also think that loyalty to such a promise would conveniently conceal a way to limit a possible defeat of the present majority, by preventing a correlative victory by the opposition through a confused situation in which there would appear to be no winner or loser. Such an undertaking could have a boomerang effect: since any manipulation of the voting process before election of the National Assembly would be considered by many citizens to be a government maneuver to favor its supporters. It is doubtful that the left would have any advantage in pursuing such a course.

Especially since it would thus run the risk of destroying the very government brought about by its 1981 victory and which does not rest solely on election of the president by universal suffrage, but also on the existence of a majority. Without a majority, neither the government nor the chief of state would have the means to act effectively. And dissolution would change nothing, since its effectiveness is almost nil with proportional voting. We have just seen this in Rome. We saw it in Paris in 1956. We see it everywhere in the same situation.

PCF Views, Demand

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 22 Jul 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Paul Laurent: "Mr Duverger's Nightmare"]

[Text] Besides communism, there is a new ghost haunting Mr Duverger's nights: proportional voting in the next National Assembly elections.* He shudders at the idea that the government is thinking of carrying out this promise made by Francois Mitterrand during his presidential election campaign and ratified in the political agreement concluded between the Socialist Party and the French Communist Party following the victory of 10 May.

*LE MONDE of 20 July 1983.

I am referring to the strange behavior of those "leftist" politicians who are gripped with anxiety every time the new majority translates its election campaign promises into actions. Nationalizations? The admirable spirit of employers will be broken! Retirement at age 60? There is a major risk for the future. New rights of workers? Watch out for "Sovietization"! I forget the rest. Let's limit ourselves today to proportional voting and to Mr Duverger.

He sees only a string of disasters with proportional voting and says anything in order to prove it. It would be the fault of proportional voting if the Christian Democratic Party dominates government coalitions in Italy, but Mr Duverger is not at all disturbed at seeing Mrs Thatcher's representatives crush the British Parliament with a minority of votes and thanks to the most unjust of majority voting systems. Does proportional voting mean stable majorities in many countries, such as Austria or Sweden? Mr Duverger sees only one explanation for this: the weakness of communist parties. But if instability prevails even with communist parties that are just as weak, as in Belgium, then it is the fault of proportional voting! It is very true, our professor just says anything!

And the description of the apocalypse doesn't end there. If the left establishes proportional voting, it will be considered by "many citizens to be a maneuver of the government to favor its supporters." In short, if the government follows through with its promises, what a calamity.

Finally, and this is the last straw, there is the gravest danger, for "even a partial return to proportional voting would run the risk of destroying the government with which the left sided in 1981." Leftist voters will no doubt be delighted to learn that their victorious vote meant above all that they sided with the government of Giscard d'Estaing, Barre and Chirac. And let them beware, for in establishing proportional voting they would risk jeopardizing it! All of that would be comical if it weren't also reactionary.

In reality, Mr Duverger is going to a lot of trouble to conceal some simple realities. The present voting system and its terms of application are profoundly unjust. It enabled Mr Couve de Murville to be elected with 12,000 votes in the eighth Paris district, whereas our comrade Rieubon needed 82,000 votes in the department of Bouches-du-Rhone.

The Communist Party loses nearly half its representation with this system. It systematically eliminates the representation of small political groups. It is this injustice which proportional voting will make it possible to eliminate in order to bring about honest representation of the country's political factions. It is for the sake of such progress for equity and such respect for universal suffrage that communists have been fighting for decades and they are glad that the president of the republic and the government have made proportional voting one of their goals.

As for government stability, in a democracy it has only one source: conformity with the will of the majority of citizens. No more today than yesterday, the

people's support cannot be replaced with the manipulation of unjust voting systems or questionable divisions in which the right has always taken delight. The left will assure the duration and strength of its power only by taking steps toward achieving its goals. This is true of proportional voting as well as the rest.

Analysis of Numbers, Power Results

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23-24 Jul 83 p 4

[Article by Edmond Bergheaud: "Parliamentary Elections: PC Wants Full Proportional Voting"]

[Text] What method of voting will be used for the 1986 parliamentary elections? While we agree, to cite an old saying, that votes are counted but not weighed, any government in power is subject to the temptation to establish a voting system which, if it doesn't assure its permanence, will nevertheless give it a kind of continuity.

The present government is no exception to this rule. It appears more and more likely that it intends to get rid of the two-round majority system and, by means of an alchemy which it considers subtle, to combine district voting and a certain amount of proportional voting. The Ministry of the Interior is working relentless on this project.

This is a project which obviously does not have the support of the Communist Party [PC], which is and has long been an advocate of full proportional voting. One PC leader, Paul Laurent, recently recalled, on the front page of L'HUMANITE yesterday, that Francois Mitterrand stated during his presidential election campaign that he intended to introduce proportional voting, which "was ratified in the political agreement concluded between the Socialist Party and the French Communist Party following the victory of 10 May 1981."

Other Facts

Condemning the present electoral system, Paul Laurent continued: "The Communist Party loses nearly half its representation with this system. It systematically eliminates the representation of small political groups. It is this injustice which proportional voting will make it possible to eliminate in order to bring about honest representation of the country's political factions."

In insisting on a change in the voting system, the PC is aiming at a triple target: to end its electoral Waterloo, to put pressure on the president of the republic, and to increase its influence over the government.

There are currently 43 communist deputies in the National Assembly. If full proportional voting had been used for the parliamentary elections of June 1981, there would be 79. As for the PS and its radical leftist allies, they would have won 184 seats and not 279. This means that the PS would not alone have had an absolute majority (246 seats). In other words, it would not have been "sure of itself and in control" with regard to the communists.

Pressure on Francois Mitterrand. The PC has a long memory. It remembers that in the last days of the Fourth Republic, the current president of the republic chaired a parliamentary committee for reinstating district voting, with the aim of breaking a Gaullism that was gathering strength again and a PC then considered a nuisance. Moreover, in 1958, Guy Mollet, then the all-powerful master of the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist Party)], himself recommended to General de Gaulle that he accept district voting, whereas the man who was taking charge of affairs was favorable to proportional voting in order to "ascertain the state of political forces in France."

For the Communist Party, however, this game is not without risks. And this is definitely why, while confining itself to full proportional voting, it is filled with suspicions about the project ascribed to the government. In fact, for the chief of state, a voting system combining district and proportional voting would have an advantage: it would create new elected officials less dependent on the large political groups. And if the left didn't obtain a majority in 1986, Francois Mitterrand could very well attempt to govern with the center and tell the communists: "Now the name of the game is power."

Regression

In the eyes of the communists and some socialists, proportional voting would give political parties a new importance. For as a result of the situation, there would be a return to those pivotal groups which, under the Fourth Republic, formed and dissolved governments according to their moods or their interests. Thus the government and, in addition, the president of the republic would be subject to constant pressures. For whether he liked it or not, the chief of state would be forced to negotiate with his majority's members of parliament. What a turning point in the history of a Fifth Republic finally reluctantly accepted by the left!

Among the opposition, there is a general outcry against any manipulation of the present election law. Thus Michel Debre wrote in LE FIGARO of 1 July: "Whereas the majority vote system gives power to the winner, proportional voting gives power to the losers. It will assure the domination of the small, who support it; they will impose their ministers. Proportional voting will profoundly change the Fifth Republic's institutions by simultaneously altering the parliamentary system, which is already weary, and the presidential system, which will be placed under supervision."

The same criticism was made by Raymond Barre: "The republic's effectiveness requires maintaining the voting system as we know it. Elections by proportional voting would result in a curtailment of the authority of the government and of the president of the republic."

In the opinion of Jacques Chirac, proportional voting is "a pernicious and undemocratic system."

More varied opinions at the UDF: Since this group is a mosaic of components, with proportional voting wouldn't each of them be tempted to play its own role in parliamentary elections, at the risk of weakening the authority of a movement which falls within the Giscardian sphere and wants to appear in the forefront of the opposition? Thus the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], unlike the PR [Radical Party], would not be unfavorable to a proportional voting system that would give it back more autonomy.

Then how could the indispensable authority of the government be reconciled with a new National Assembly that would be torn between factions which, as a result of the situation, would be more contradictory than complementary?

By appearing favorable to proportional voting, the government is being faithful to its choices, of course. But since it is not exactly practicing to be angelic, it definitely hopes to cause dissension among its opponents.

(191)

CSO: 3519/576

U.S. SEEN PLAYING PASOK'S GAME IN BASES NEGOTIATIONS

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 22-28 Jul 83 pp 18,22

[Article by Mikhail Melas]

[Text] If one cool-headedly looks at the way the map of the world has developed from the time of Yalta until today, he will with awe become aware of how much the United States' area of influence has shrunk and, correspondingly, how much, through peaceful or armed acquisitions or "interventions," the Soviet Union has extended itself. Without fighting anywhere, of course, but "by proxy" alone.

The only exception has been Afghanistan where Soviet troops are still fighting, thus interfering openly in a country which it always had an eye on, though it used to keep up appearances. Now the mask has fallen and the Soviet Union's strategic plans, surmised for decades, have appeared nakedly. Its immovable target is the Arab world's oil and through this, essential control of the universe!

The prolongation of the Iranian-Iraqi war is also undoubtedly to the benefit of the Soviet Union because it debilitates the two warring countries which, together with Kuwait, are the number-one target in the field of its expansionist ambitions. This is also the meaning of its continuing occupancy of Afghanistan, where construction of six Soviet air bases has been quietly completed, to be used as a base of operations for planned hostilities in the gulf.

While these things are happening in the wider area of the Middle East, as expected, Turkey is acquiring increasing value in the eyes of the West and the United States. And we must not exclude the possibility that at some moment, our newly initiated "ministerial diplomats" began to comprehend the realistic elements which make up the picture in our wider area, blunting the delusions, the utopia and the self-deceptions which have led us in the last 18 months to mistaken conclusions and superficial or even harmful maneuvers. Because it is unquestionable that we displayed inexcusable immaturity in handling and promoting our foreign plans, carried away by anything but our well-understood interest, logic or reality.

The sensitivities provoked by the Arabs' overdeveloped nationalism would never allow creation of U.S. bases on their soil. This forced the United States to negotiate to establish bases on the Iberian Peninsula and in Turkey. And while the Portuguese are discussing it, in Turkey the U.S. air bases have already begun to be modernized, and even more recently we learned about two new NATO bases in the same country.

This ensures that the Atlantic and Mediterranean could be connected by air in case the "God forbid" should happen--that is, to the Azores, to Portugal and from there to Turkey, if unforeseen developments in the area of the Middle East or the Arab world required it.

These prospects, springing from Russia's insatiable thirst--which only Iran and Iraq's oil would slake--create the precedence given to our neighbor, Turkey, without our own presence being taken into account. The bases, the Greek ones and Souda, are of interest to NATO and the United States only in the case of a dispute in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, no further east.

It is for this reason doubtful that those manipulating our foreign policy--who, with so much superficiality and self-conceit and "superiority" complexes, judged it expedient to remove the real experts in diplomatic operations in every civilized and intelligent country--did not think, in all the time that the issue of aid to Turkey was being discussed in relation to our country, of demanding entry of a condition safeguarding us which would reveal our allies' real intentions and would dissolve every cloud of distrust weighing in the Greeks' minds.

In other words, besides acceptance and establishment of the seven-to-ten ratio as a security measure for the Greek-Turkish balance of forces, seeking entry of an additional condition that: The military aid given by the United States to Turkey does not apply to Turkish forces intended for defense of its western borders on the Aegean (but exclusively and only its land borders to the north, east and south). Because no one is justified in disputing our right to fear--beyond any prejudice from past bitter experiences in Cyprus in 1974--that reinforcement from Germany or any other country of Turkey's already numerous landing fleet may not have any relation to the Soviet danger, or Iran, Iraq or Syria.

The effort PASOK is making on ERT [Greek Radio and Television] and in its newspapers to present the Turks, on the one hand, as ostensibly angry at the Americans, and EKE, on the other, as supposedly enraged at PASOK over the bases agreement is grossly inept. Even in the most loving families, quarrels and disagreements are expected. In the case in point, however, not only is this not happening, not only is there no anger, but both these parties knew the agreement was imminent and expected it. Only little children would believe anything else.

Whoever knows only the alpha of international diplomatic practice knows that, in Washington especially, interested embassies have a way of being informed in good time of the contents of such "agreements"--which in some way or another will at some moment become more widely known. And since Turkey correctly cultivates its public relations with the U.S. authorities and maintains a skillful, organized embassy (not rendered useless and dismantled like our own government does in order to have a contented ambitious personal friend in Kastro), even the most distrustful person can believe that, for the Turks, such "secrets" do not exist. They probably cannot be informed of things labelled "confidential" only. And we all know about things relating to the seven-to-ten ratio in defense aid; we read them in the daily press, sometimes as forecast and sometimes as news. Consequently, there was nothing hidden or mysterious that would justify, a posteriori, Mr. Turkmen's astonishment or anger; such are meant only for those PASOK adherents blinded by enthusiasm or fanaticism. It is well-known that fanaticism destroys logic and nullifies judgment.

With this effort to present the agreement as ostensibly under fire from the Turks, the government hopes to create the impression in KKE that the Turks feel injured by our great diplomatic success. And by presenting itself as presumably under earnest fire from KKE, it wants to make its more centrist adherents forget the "parallel lives" and the identity of the government and KKE's goals and ambitions which is obvious on too many issues, unfortunately.

The bitter truth for PASOK is that, at this moment specifically, Mr. Florakis' "Mother Russia" has turned its mind much more to the lifting and replacement of martial law in Poland than to the U.S. bases in Greece, which are not a new element but continuation of a very old situation. In fact, by respecting the United States' right to defensively cover the area in its own sphere of influence, the Soviet Union expects "reciprocity" in whatever concerns its relations with its own East Bloc countries.

Mr. Papandreu has old ties with the United States. He belongs to the generation of economists who came forward with devotion to serve the completion of "Allaghi," and therefore to try to ensure PASOK's power indefinitely. And they are all, or nearly all, American-educated and American-acting. But, aside from the tiresome and already worn-out...sloganizing, there is no law which says socialism is equal to anti-Americanism.

In addition, there are few ignorant of how much aid the United States offered to Mr. Papandreu's party around the time of the 1977 elections, for its rise to power even then. They had never forgiven Mr. Karamanlis for "snubbing" them in 1974 with our withdrawal from NATO, and afterwards. And when pressured by the leaders of the West, and wanting to show his good faith and our intention to negotiate, he agreed to meet Mr. Ecevit in Montreux, Switzerland, aside from platonic generalities, he did not concede anything to his fellow-converser, thus disappointing the secret hopes of the pro-Turkish inspirers of the meeting. Also, our prudent and cautious policy towards Turkey in the period 1974 to 1980 probably did not thoroughly please Washington because it took away opportunities and excuses from the opposite side. Until, with clear enervation and impatience, Congress, pressured by the Pentagon, allowed the aid to Turkey to resume with the lifting of the arms embargo.

The warlike exhortations of the opposition at that time let it appear that there would be a tactic of open confrontation with Turkey if it were to become the governing party. We would then fall into the spread nets and Mr. Luns and Haig or Rogers would amuse themselves as long as they liked. But when the 1981 elections ended--and in the beginning it was found the former "hardliners" on the walls could abound in inimitable slogans like "Get out of Greece"--the new prime minister reserved his wide smiles and cordialities to Mr. Haig, who we considered a symbol of pro-Turkism. Anti-Americanism or self-containment? Blowing up bridges to the United States of capitalism and monopolies, or an inclination for friendly cooperation? Mr. Papandreu appeared to be playing the Americans' game. Loyal to NATO and open about discussing the bases issue. Furthermore, when the former U.S. negotiators had postponed negotiating with the Rallis government until after the 1981 elections, was not the former opposition leader, who was already pre-anointed as future prime minister, in agreement? And, regardless of his proclamations, it must be acknowledged that, until the end, he maintained a stance which was consistent and absolutely amicable toward the United States, until the time when the contract for the bases' retention was sealed as an exotic decision for their "departure."

Considering the agreement completed and Greek acceptance understood, the Americans then eagerly agreed to play Mr. Papandreou's game. When the negotiating had reached its end, without serious impediments or difficulties, and the journalists--notified by the prime minister himself--held in their hands the memo about the imminent "announcement" and the champagne was already on ice, they faced with understanding the "Movement of the Dauphins," which impeded the signing. They then willingly played Mr. Papandreou's game, without, of course, any regard for his ultimate threats or his ostensibly harsh "warnings" on television. They knew better than he how important it was for the agreement to appear as a victory owing to our prime minister's political genius and dynamism in order to hold the party's extreme leftists.

It was not the moment for the communist voters to suddenly become inflamed. They were the ones who subsidized the 1981 electoral victory, with the expectancy and certainty that PASOK, in power, would act politically in the domestic area as a Trojan horse of communism, for the gradual capture of the state by the extreme-leftist forces.

This was the soap opera at the final hour, with its protagonist the exhausted Andreas, who we all saw had for a prompter not one, as is usual, but all those senior translators of the party interest--not, in God's name, the national interest. And our foreign fellow-conversers helped, with their discreet silence, in getting through a crisis which endangered the party's cohesiveness and lessened its leader's prestige. For once it was not Kasti which was the boss, but the presumptive Dauphins. It was the tail wagging the dog.

The longer Bartholomew delayed returning and the farce was perpetuated, the better prepared was the exhibition of the "triumph" which will safeguard "for the first time" national independence, freedom and national pride. And if there had been no fear that their blue-blooded brothers from the left would be inflamed by the provocation of "pro-Americanism," the green-guards and green-mandarins would have put on their festive clothes more openly. They would have slaughtered lambs and sounded the flutes, drums and violas, in the hope that the people would forget for awhile their economic degradation, glorifying the hero of the victory.

But, for God's sake do not let these people of good faith perceive how different the words are from reality. And let the lights be low so that the transparency of the veils of anti-Americanism cannot be seen.

One thing only do we wish. Let us make the correct choices with the 500 million dollars in credits which the United States is giving us in 1984 as unacknowledged rent or, at any rate, a discount exchange for use of the bases for another seven years at least. Let KYSYM and KYSEA [Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense], which now decide, in their unchecked wisdom, about the choice of new war aircraft and how to pay for them, not base their decision only on the duty which the government feels, or which it undertook, towards the Pentagon.

From recent conversations in Kerkyra with the French minister of defense, it emerges through *reductio ad absurdum* that we will procure the remaining 60 percent of the total purchase for this century from the United States, choosing--obviously--the F16. Let it be certain, at least, that these orders, which put aside

the TORNADO, which is of joint European construction, are not dictated by "duty" only towards Comrade Mitterand and the U.S. "military-industrial establishment" which is protected and led by the Pentagon.

On these delicate military-technical issues, let the opinion of specialists be heard more and the political opinion--along with the further party interest--of senior government echelons be heard less. Because it is obvious that, more than ever, they are interested in being on good terms with Washington, which is always strong, always useful and always selfish in its friendships and preferences.

PASOK is now playing their game. Until, I wonder, it will be in the United States' interest, and will accomodate them, to play PASOK's game?

9/4/7

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STATEMENT OF A COUNTER-CURRENT WITHIN PASOK AT CC MEETING

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 31 Jul 83 p 4

[Article by Aristeidis Manolakos: "And a Statement of Counter-Current Within PASOK at CC Meeting"]

[Text] The CC meeting of PASOK is continuing behind closed doors with interruptions and proposals by its members, in reference to the speech of the prime minister and the introductory statement of the Executive Office. It is an old tradition for the parties of the Left to want these meetings behind closed doors so that views can be expressed without diversion from the audience or the temptation of personal projection for the speakers. Many times, however, this ends up creating a false image for the problems the party is confronted with and the solutions it adopts. Solutions that in the case of PASOK refer to the course of the country and are of interest to all Greeks.

The political introductory speech of Mr Anr. Papandreou and the introductory speech of the Executive Office are fraught with optimism. They are the only texts that were published. In the Central Committee, however, anxious voices are being heard and views opposing the official ones are being expressed, both regarding the policies of the governing party and for the method of ruling the country. Indeed, perhaps it is the first time, to utilize a favorite PASOK expression, after the departure and the removal of the forces of "Democratic Defense" in 1976, that such intense dissensions are being expressed.

The years that passed on the road to power created the climate that, as ANTI wrote last April, "gave the potential to the PASOK president and the party mechanism to compose the heterogeneous social base and the heterogeneous political personnel of the movement in the general declaration of Allagi. Running the government 'shook' the PASOK structure, however, because it created a 'neutral' field where all of its contradictions are intensely expressed".

Twenty one months after the electoral success of PASOK, it is natural to have the Central Committee re-examine the problems related to the policy of the Movement, the clarification of its targets and its internal condition.

One of the voices that came to the Central Committee comes from the Organization of PASOK and rejects the view that the prime minister had expressed that certain degenerative phenomena are due to interventions of the party organization in

the government's work. According to this view, that is stated in 19 typewritten pages as an addendum and was expressed in an introductory statement of Mr N. Kargopoulos, a CC member, not only the party base, but also the Parliamentary Team of PASOK have "been put in the corner" and policy is exercised by unorthodox groups relative to the function of PASOK.

According to the speaker, that is what causes the degenerative phenomena, but blames it on the total change of views and targets after the party came to power. The speaker supports that the PASOK that sought power has little resemblance to the PASOK that is exercising power.

The view of Mr Kargopoulos who resigned as secretary of the Organizational committee and as a member of the Committee with seven other members in May 1982, after, as he stated in his introductory speech, his efforts to make the president and the executive office change their minds failed, may be described as a typical "leftist" view in PASOK. It reflects opinions and positions supported by many nomarchical organizations. This, in his opinion, led the leadership of PASOK to "autocratic interventions" in the nomarchical committees of Mytilene, Rhodes, Corfu, Preveza, Argolida, Karditsa and others that resulted in "strengthening the nome forces that supported factors of influence and what was socially established in the legislature".

It appears, however, that the efforts to replace the nomarchical committees have failed. Certain recent facts bear witness to this: The nomarchical committee of Mytilene was taken to the disciplinary council, but the case was not tried, because when the members of the committee came to Athens, they brought about 1,000 signatures of people supporting them from the local organization. The nomarchical committee of Preveza that was replaced maintains complete control of the PASOK forces of the district and led a rally against the initialing of the agreement for the bases. In Larissa, the Minister of the Interior and member of the Executive Office of PASOK, Mr G. Gennimatas, while speaking during a meeting of the nomarchical committee, was sharply against the views that are stated in the previously mentioned introductory statement and that create a problem for the governmental party.

It is reasonable for one to suppose that the members of the Central Committee have expressed their views and that late in the day opposite views will be heard that have not been noted yet by the journalistic research. We hope that the "ingredients" of the 10th Congress will be given for publication so that the public will be fully informed.

What are the views of the former secretary of the Organizational Committee? We restrict ourselves to a selective presentation of these views that we believe reflect their substance. According to his opinion: "Change is progressing slowly. The negative sides are dominant in our political line. The people are in a margin. The government and central party officials have a concept that no matter how hard we try we cannot find that it has much to do with the ideas of socialism. All of this has become known to the people of the Attica plain who are near to the central authority and whose transfer to the province has begun." After standing undecided at the crossroads, the PASOK government later made it clear that it is following the road of incorporation in the system.

This way it entered the road without return that all the "socialist" governments of Western Europe take. A road where compromises increase in number and importance with the unavoidable consequence of weakening the PASOK government. There is a danger that the winner will be the Right, since in the conscience of a large number of citizens of a PASOK failure means a general failure of socialism and of the Left."

"The arrogance of power, the haughtiness, the lack of respect of the citizen and the people are the main features of the type of ruling. The mass movement became an enemy instead of a lever. Bribery has reached serious dimensions. The government mechanism is full of officials who would be described by Makrygiannis as "Damn the freedom we will have with these people." The effort of the prime minister to separate his responsibilities by making declarations and admonitions is not convincing because the people are asking two simple questions: Why did he put them there? Why is he leaving them there?

Our international relations in general are identified as following a peace loving, progressive line, but within the framework of "we belong to the West." The "counter-current speaker" claims that the Cypriot question has been abandoned after the Cypriot presidential elections by dropping an aggressive line. The Turkish Cypriot "government" is promoting its relations (it was represented with an observer at the congress of Non-Aligned countries in New Delhi), "nothing is being said about the Cypriot file and even if it is opened no great light is expected to be shed on it".

Regarding the bases (the text predates the agreement) the speaker claims that "the agreement will not have the colonial character of the respective agreements made by the right. It will, however, secure the American interests and will postpone the matter of their removal to the distant future". Regarding NATO: "there is a difference from the policy of the ND on only secondary issues". About the EEC: "the government simply is negotiating harder than the ND governments".

"With all this," claims the text, "we do not forget the difficulties for an independent foreign policy, or the dangers for our national integrity and we understand the need for tactical compromises. But the matter simply is not a matter of governmental handling. Only a mass popular mobilization can allow sure steps on the road to national integrity and independence".

The "counter-current" rejects the idea of PASOK participation in the Socialist International and proposed the active participation of the country in the Non-Aligned movement". "We do not support", it states, "PASOK's isolation from foreign progressive parties and movements. We believe it must have good relations with the socialist and communist movements and especially with national liberation movements. The friendly relations with the socialist parties of the West, however, must not take away from us the right to dare effect the transition to socialism that these parties would not dare or even envision".

"The economic policy of 1983 was not the consequent step of 1982 (for building changes) and promised big capital that its profits will not be touched. The principal factor in the increase of competitiveness is the compression of the price of the labor force".

The law for socialization "the only sure thing is that it was principally an effort to confront strike mobilizations", while the participation of the workers in the administration of the organizations in the public sector "if the terms of their materialization are not clarified absolutely, will evolve into the embodiment of the labor union leadership to a government policy embodied in the system". The supervisory councils "in the private sector will not play a special role with their way of operating. The daily life of the workers does not change".

"The new concept (inside PASOK) has as its dominating element the ascent of the party, the participation in power. The method is not to prove worth by working in the organization, but by the declaration of loyalty to some powerful official who is believed to get his power from the person of the president. The intrigues, the petty hatreds, the immoral ways, the provocations are all in the order of the day. The organized base is considered to be a service mechanism compelled to play the role of strikebreaker and poster hanger with no right to a political voice".

There is a differentiation "between the party base, that is considered to be immature and unworthy of attention, and a new party and government establishment, "enlightened", that believes it can administer the government and the party without any control". This establishment made of those who are exercising power is first and foremost characterized by degenerative phenomena."

The "counter-current" supports that "this course must be shut off" and that "according to the record the (present) meeting of the Central Committee is the last limit for a radical change at all levels" so that there will be a potential "to convince the people". Specifically, in the organizational field "a change in concept, organizational policy, structures, central officials". In the mass movement "political intervention of the PASOK organization, politicizing and mobilization of the masses, abandonment of government syndicalism, a real dialogue and cooperation between the government and the mass movement." In the political line, "structural changes in all the sectors of government policy."

The views we have presented undoubtedly have the purity that distinguishes the writers of the Left. It is difficult, however, for these points to be composed in a unique line, when the intention is to interpret the actual phenomena of PASOK authority with opposing criteria. For instance, the "third world" concept that appears in the text and that actually adopts the current political proposals of the KKE on matters of foreign policy clashes with the concept of the democratic road to socialism that requires the participation of the people and political pluralism in the interior, a concept that is supported with a passion by this "counter-current." Whatever the worth of this text, beyond its observations, could be attributed to the fact that it reflects a liquidity in the party base, that is not the only identifying feature of the government party, but permeates all the political formations.

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150: 3521/397

POLITICAL

GREECE

SPORTS COOPERATION WITH USSR PLANNED

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Aug 83 p 8

[Text] We will Host their Teams at the Opympic Stadium.

"My trip to Moscow was especially useful and beneficial, during which I had contacts with the athletic leadership of the USSR. Both Greece and the USSR will benefit from the cooperation of the two countries in athletics." The General Secretary of Athletics [GGA], Mr K Koulouris, stated this yesterday regarding his visit to the capital of the USSR. The GGA said that the athletic exchanges the two countries agreed upon will start soon.

Specifically:

By October, technicians of the GGA will visit athletic installations in the USSR.

In 1983, Soviet trainers will come to Greece to lecture at seminars for two months.

Soviet specialists will help us in athletic research.

Similarly, the Soviets asked:

That we host national teams at the Olympic Center for training in view of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles in 1984.

To have Greek participation in technical matters.

Mr Koulouris emphasized that the cooperation will be substantial and without reservations.

9346

CSO: 3521/397

EX-SECRETARIAT MEETING IN LIGHT OF PS CONGRESS

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 9

[Article by Carlos Pires and Ribeiro Ferreira]

[Text] The approximately 200 delegates who belong to the ex-Secretariat are going to meet in Coimbra on 10 September to prepare for the PS's fifth congress which will be held in the beginning of October.

The decision was made to hold this meeting last Saturday in Lisbon during a meeting of several people from different district federations who belong to this socialist faction. Meanwhile, we note that Jorge Sampaio, Vitor Constancio, Antonio Guterres, Salgado Zenha and Joao Cravinho were not present.

Contrary to what was reported, this second meeting in Coimbra will not determine whether or not to abolish the faction. However, some important members wish to keep their distance from the faction opposed to the majority supporting Mario Soares. The ex-Secretariat delegates are thus going to decide on a common strategy of action for this congress despite the fact they were elected on the basis of three motions supported by Antonio Guterres, Manuel dos Santos and Jorge Vicente.

Soares Attempts to Form a Consensus List

If the ex-Secretariat is given a guarantee it will continue to have an important position in the PS's national bodies, it may be induced to discuss the formation of consensus lists with the majority, which would be to Mario Soares' liking.

Mario Soares may have three clear objectives in attempting to reach an agreement on this matter: pacify the party, stop the dissent toward the government's harsh measures and get internal consensus for his 1985 bid for the presidency. For many observers, in effect, Mario Soares will only have a chance of winning these elections if he is able to bring the PS [Socialist Party]/PSD [Social Democratic Party] government to a successful conclusion. A government for 1985 which, if Mario Soares obtains the support of Mota Pinto's PSD, will be able to overcome the "Cape of Tempests." However, the price for this possible agreement will be very high for the socialists. The government's very leadership may pass to the PSD's hands at that time.

Although he did not admit such a possibility, Jaime Gama said in a recent interview that he felt it was inevitable that the PS/PSD and the government would reach an agreement. Some people believe this is the launching pad for perhaps the last political battle between Mario Soares and Ramalho Eanes.

Troika Stays on Its Feet

The ex-Secretariat, which is in an obviously unfavorable position, aspires to take on a relatively diminished role should there be divisions in the current majority. Although the fifth congress will be calm, it will not unfold, however, without having Mario Soares succession as a backdrop. The possibility of [choosing] a troika to lead the party during a transition period until a new secretary general is chosen remains open.

Even if no consensus is reached in forming the lists, the ex-Secretariat may have about 20 percent of the seats on the National Committee (as opposed to one-third in the current committee). The Political Committee should have the same composition as the National Committee. It is certain that the Permanent Committee (and the troika) will all be from Mario Soares' camp.

It should be recalled that the National Committee elected at the fourth congress (still in office) has the following makeup: 61 percent belong to the secretary general's faction (1095 of the 1400 delegates voted for Soares' motion), 37 percent (609 votes) belong to the ex-Secretariat and 4 percent (60 votes) belong to the Labor Left.

In addition to the 151 members elected at the congress to the National Committee, there are also 10 delegates from the Socialist Youth as well as 10 "socialist women" and the 25 coordinators of the district federations.

Mario Soares was able to win the vote on his motion by receiving 1229 votes (72 percent) out of a possible 1400.

991.

C.O. 1042/181

STRIKE AT LISNAVE SHIPYARD RETURNS TO NORMAL

Back to Work

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 1

[Excerpt] The company Lisnave began to return to normal operations at 8:00 yesterday after a workers' general assembly decided to ratify the agreement signed the day before yesterday by the workers' general council and administration representatives.

The terms of the agreement are: the workers agree to return to work which they had abandoned on 7 June and to maintain "labor peace" in Lisnave for 3 months while Parempresa, a parastatal organization involved in helping firms recover, prepares a workable contract.

On the other hand, the administration will pay each employee 30 contos on Monday as a first installment of the backwages for the last 3 months. This payment will be made from 180,000 contos which the Secretariat of State for Employment will provide immediately, and an additional 90,000 from bank loans.

Retirement pensions for May will also be paid from a government grant which is part of the group of measures contained in the firm's financial indemnification agreement."

The administration also agrees "not to make changes in its labor force" until the above mentioned "workable contract" goes into effect 3 months from now.

Workers: No 'Social Truce'

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Jul 83 p 4

[Excerpt] At a press conference yesterday, the Lisnave workers denied that the proposal agreed to with the firm's administration includes a "social truce." They admit that new forms of struggle could be used at any time, from the moment they consider the agreement has been violated or workers' rights and guarantees are "put in question."

Contrary to what was agreed on 6 July at the Labor Ministry, but not ratified by all the workers, the employees are not bound by any agreement not to

hold protests during 90 days, according to what their representatives said.

Another change introduced in that first text deals with granting "worker control." This will allow the workers' representative bodies to have access to the order estimates. It also provides that they participate in all phases of production, including "billing."

The workers also underscore that in addition to "safeguarding their right to protest" and temporarily guaranteeing all jobs, the text also guarantees payment of backwages through a previously established schedule. The first payment will be made Monday with each worker receiving 30 contos toward the total amount owed him.

New Stage of Struggle

Meanwhile, the compromise reached on the 19th was considered by the shipyard workers to be "a first phase in resolving the conflict." They stress that there is a situation in Lisnave "which will shortly lead the workers toward a new stage of struggle."

According to what they said, the battle lies in the approval of a viability plan the administration is going to prepare but which will have to have the approval of the Labor Ministry and the workers themselves. As for this plan, the workers' representatives showed they intended not to accept "any removal of privileges, particularly jobs."

The viability plan should, according to their statements, provide for "the nationalization of the main stockholder's capital" and not "aim toward rebuilding the monopoly of private stockholders." As for the demand made throughout the negotiations calling for the immediate resignation of the current administration, the workers said it had been withdrawn and it will not be included in the counterproposal for making the firm viable. However, they refuse the members of the administration of "bad management."

762/101

BRIEFS

MILITARY PAY CUT--The government will propose a 10 percent reduction in soldiers' pay starting in 1984. Yesterday Defense Minister Hans Engell presented a proposal on the reduction to draftee organizations. The proposal will now be discussed with the defense compromise parties. This is linked to a special job offer arrangement for soldiers who complete their service. It is intended to ease soldiers' transition to jobs in civilian life. According to the finance minister, the government's reason for reducing pay for soldiers is that many of the very young men who are called in for compulsory service are paid a considerably larger amount than their grades who may be studying or in apprenticeship positions. If the 11-man committee supports the government in a change of the pay scale for draftees it will mean a reduction of 839 kroner for draftees over the age of 18 and 111 kroner for draftees who are under 18 years of age. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Aug 83 p 8] 6578

ARMED FORCES UNITS REORGANIZE--In the future, around 400 fewer men will be used at Alborg Air Base, according to the Defense Command. A hiring freeze and a transfer of personnel to other types of service will reduce involuntary layoffs as much as possible, it was revealed in Vedbaek. The background for the reduction is that they have abandoned the idea of making savings by moving the air force transport squadron, rescue squadron and the naval flying service from Vaerloose to one or more air bases in Jutland. The Defense Command has determined that the amount saved in such a move from Vaerloose would not stand in reasonable proportion to the inconveniences this would cause. But savings cuts must be made and that is why the activity level at the Vaerloose Air Base is being reduced. At Alborg Air Base, the aging F-104 Starfighter fighter bombers are scheduled to be phased out, a process that will be completed in 1985. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Aug 83 p 7] 6578

CS 3613/181

WOERNER PRESENTS 1984 DEFENSE BUDGET

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 83 pp 14-17

[Text] One day after adoption of the overall budget by the Federal Cabinet, Defense Minister Dr. Manfred Woerner presented the government estimates of the defense budget providing for 1984 expenditures of DM 48.62 billion to the press at the Bonn defense ministry.

The minister's statement on the budget included the following: "The defensive strength cannot be maintained without stable finances and a healthy economy. Therefore we had to make cuts in our objectives and I cannot deny that I would have liked to have more here and there. However, it was and remains just as obvious that in financially difficult times, too, the FRG defensive capability must be maintained and the ability of the Bundeswehr to fulfill its mission must not be reduced. We are obligated to this course not only because of our contribution to the alliance and the clear statements of the Federal Chancellor in his government declaration, but above all because of our responsibility to continue to make possible for our citizens a life in security and freedom and to prevent the outbreak of a war.

The 1984 defense budget, including the increase in funds for personnel, provides for a 3.7 percent growth. That is twice the growth rate of the overall budget. This fact makes evident the great importance attached to external security by the Federal Government."

Personnel Expenditures Minimal--Great Effect

It is virtually unheard of that the personnel costs will increase only 3.6 percent, that the costs of material maintenance and operations will be merely 1.1 percent higher and the expenditure category of operating expenditures will grow only 2.4 percent.

1984 Defense Budget (Departmental Budget 14)

Item	Billion DM	
1984 federal budget	257.70	(+1.8%)
Defense budget	48.62	(+3.7%)
<hr/>		
Operations		
- Personnel	19.99	(+3.6%)
- Material maintenance	4.51	(+1.1%)
- Other operations	7.01	(-0.1%)
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Operations, total	31.48	(+2.4%)
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Investments		
- Research and development	1.98	(+8.6%)
- Military procurement	12.58	(+6.5%)
- Military installations	2.01	(+8.3%)
- Other investments	0.54	(+10.9%)
<hr/>		
Investments, total	17.11	(+7.1%)

Nevertheless primarily personnel improvements that will become effective in the future were achieved. Even though no new T/O positions were authorized in the overall federal budget, 4,500 more extended-term volunteer soldiers are to be recruited in 1984 on an annual average as compared to 1983 (in addition to the number of separations), i.e. 258,000 instead of 254,000 (in 1982, there were only 251,000). This will be a further effective step toward reducing the NCO shortage and toward taking precautions concerning personnel for the period after 1986 when the number of trainees will greatly decline on account of the low birthrate and will reach their low point about 1990 (50 percent fewer than today). In this connection, Dr. Woerner stressed that he will keep the promise from the cabinet that he would be able to increase the number of volunteers to 260,000 by 1987.

Precautionary financial measures were also adopted so that the number of reserve duty trainees with 6,000 on an annual average is 1,000 higher than in 1983. Thus the Bundeswehr is able to

call up as many as 180,000 reservists and thus maintain their state of training.

In 1984 a second step is being taken to reduce the bottleneck in promotions (first step taken in 1983 with 350 positions) by creating 200 new positions (officers and NCOs). Thus over 1,000 position upgradings will be possible in the Bundeswehr. For 1985 additional 150 position upgradings have been promised. The plan for reorganization of the army into Army Structure 4 provides for 400 new soldier positions for NCOs. The minister called it regrettable that the military pay can be increased not before 1985, not in 1984 as intended.

Moreover, the Bundeswehr succeeded in making a small contribution to the reduction of youth unemployment: in the civilian area, 185 additional training slots over and above the Bundeswehr's own were established for administrative specialists, cooks, electricians, mechanics, printers, and laboratory technicians.

Dr. Woerner gave the assurance that the funds allocated for 1984 for material maintenance operations, and other operating expenses will permit adherence to the full and unrestricted exercise and training operation.

12.5 Billion for Procurement

Even with a slight increase in personnel costs and almost unchanged operating expenses, most of the budget pie is allocated to the further increase in the combat strength of the armed forces: research and development, procurement and infrastructure.

The change in the research and development trend--a 10 percent increase had in fact been set for the current fiscal year but the leveling of the turnover tax virtually wiped it out--can now be continued in 1984 with an 8.4 percent increase and thus the resources required for adapting the progressing development of armament technology can be advanced or newly instituted.

The funds for military procurement are increased by 6.5 percent to DM 12.58 billion. Thus not only the current generation change in weapons systems can be continued but also necessary peripheral equipment for reconnaissance, command and support can be procured. Only in this manner do the new weapons and command systems become fully operational and their combat effectiveness will be increased.

The minister also regards as part of the "development and procurement projects" upgrading of combat effectiveness of the

the ROLAND, the ROLAND air defense system, the combat support vehicles of the generation of the nineties for the army, the combat ship of the nineties as well as an improvement of the fighting capabilities of all military services.

Important procurement decisions Woerner mentioned the fighter aircraft of the nineties, as well as the PAH 2 (antitank helicopter 2) which still has to be approved by the parliament and the U.S. PATRIOT air defense system. In this connection he called "air defense" an Achilles heel. He said he is not sure whether we are going to succeed in developing a combined ROLAND-PATRIOT system for the protection also of the Germany military airfields and naval air fields, especially since a political decision on this subject has to be made on the highest level in the United States.

Medium-term Projects

Procurement

Communications material:	--RASIT (battlefield surveillance radar)
	--SEM 70/80/90 radios
	--Automatic command telecommunications network (GAFCON)
	--Automated Corps telecommunications network II
Vehicle cranes	--Vehicle cranes, light and medium
	--2-ton ambulances, cross country
	--2-ton ambulances tml
Armor	--MARDER counterarming
	--Self-propelled howitzer counterarming
	--M 109 G
	--MLRS/MARS
Missiles	--Guided missile/MARS
	--Guided missile S/L RAM
	--Guided missile Patriot
	--Antitank mine (Verlegemine)
	--Antitank disperse mine
Naval material, ships	--Patriot
	--U-206, maintenance of combat effectiveness
	--Class 748 multipurpose boat

Aircraft

- CL. 289 drone
- Medium range aircraft for instant reaction

Developments

- HEPARD air defense tank 2 (upgrading combat effectiveness)
- ROLAND air defense rocket tank 2 (upgrading combat effectiveness)
- Combat vehicles for the nineties
- 155-L field howitzer, smart ammunition
- THAWF-maintenance of combat effectiveness
- New helicopter 95
- ALPHA-1E1 upgrading of combat effectiveness
- Fighter aircraft 90
- Radar-link-4E/improvement of radar
- Air target display
- Combat ship for the nineties
- Remote control of sea mine

For procurement of ammunition, DM 2 billion has been earmarked for the new fiscal year, that is DM 200 million more than in 1991. Expenditures for telecommunications material will increase DM 125 million to DM 620 million.

Finally DM 2 billion is to be channeled into infrastructure measures, that is about 8.3 percent more than during the current year. These funds are to finance in the first place construction of barracks and at the same time the creation of new jobs. The above-average increase of 10.9 percent for other investments, with DM 256 million, is earmarked for one-time expenditures from the federal energy-saving and building construction program.

Investment for the Future

Purely optically, 3.7 percent or 2.8 percent growth that has not been adjusted for inflation does not correspond to a real 3-percent increase, as approved by the NATO defense ministers. A

Important increase does not necessarily lead to a corresponding increase in combat strength. Proportional increases in personnel expenditures are pleasant for those affected, but as regards combat strength they are relatively ineffective. On the other hand, the above-average increase in investment expenditures as provided in the 1984 defense budget for modern weapons systems, improved infrastructure, and future-oriented research and development is an investment for the future. Dr. Woerner placed special emphasis on this very statement in view of the practice of some other NATO states.

In connection with the new defense budget, the defense minister also dealt with his ideas for the next few years. Three big planning tasks have to be taken care of in this connection:

On the one hand, the most important plan targets must be again worked up, such as the "concept of the Bundeswehr as regards strategic objectives" as well as the concepts of some military services. On the other hand, Dr. Woerner demanded preparation of the Bundeswehr armament planning not for 4 years as in the past but for the entire duration of the Bundeswehr plan, for 12 years, "planned to the last penny" calculated on the basis of a realistic plan target.

GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE TOTAL BAN ON SALE, USE OF DDT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Aug 83 Sec II p 4

[Article by Poul Erik Petersen]

[Text] Starting 1 October of next year, there will be a total ban on the sale or use of DDT in Denmark, it was decided by the Environmental Agency, which issued an announcement on the ban.

In reality DDT will be removed from the Danish market as early as the beginning of next year, since the Koge Chemical Plant, the only Danish producer of the product, has voluntarily agreed to halt sales.

In the 1950's and 1960's, DDT was a much-used spray in both agriculture and forestry, but it became apparent that this use created environmental problems. DDT breaks down very slowly and it is stored up in food chains.

As early as 1969, the use of DDT in farming has been banned, while since 1978 forestry has had permission to use the poison to a very limited extent to protect small evergreens against beetle attacks.

Every person in the world is walking around with DDT or metabolized DDT products in his body, according to section director Knud Voldum-Clausen of the State Food Institute. Danes too will continue to absorb DDT even after the ban, especially from certain animal products. The poison comes from foods imported from countries who view its use more leniently than we do in Denmark and than most other European countries do.

Since the problem with DDT was discovered and people started to limit its use, there has been a large decline in the DDT content of various foods, and it is expected that this decline will continue, according to Voldum-Clausen.

DDT is still found in fatty fish such as herring and salmon, as well as in cod liver, while lean Danish fish are largely free of DDT.

6/13

OSD: 3613/181

DRINKING WATER TO BE SURVEYED NATIONWIDE FOR NITRATE CONTENT

(originally in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Aug 83 p 4)

(Article by Michael Rastrup Smith)

(Text) In a short time the Environmental Agency will publish an extensive survey of the nitrate content of Danish drinking water. The study is given added relevance by the fact that three North Sjaelland waterworks are supplying drinking water with a nitrate content that is too high.

Despite the fact that it is North Sjaelland that has been in the spotlight recently, the study from the Environmental Agency shows that the biggest problems with drinking water that contains nitrates are found in Jutland, while in general the islands lie far below the maximum limit of 50 milligrams of nitrates per liter water. In Jutland it is especially the western districts and the sandy mid-Jutland areas that are affected.

The Environmental Agency's study says that there are four reasons for the increased nitrate content of our drinking water. One of them is increased agricultural use of organic fertilizers, which produces nitrates in the drinking water. But the survey mentions that dumps, drainpipes and leach pipes also contribute to the problem.

"We have not found out which of the four sources is the major pollutant. We will look into that in our next study," said agronomist Hans Henrik Christensen of the Environmental Agency. "Our study shows that nitrate pollution has not reached a disturbing level on a nationwide basis. But we are concerned about the tendency there is toward steadily rising pollution."

In the last few days it has been revealed that three water works in North Sjaelland have concentrations of nitrates in the drinking water that exceed the Environmental Agency's maximum limits. The facilities involved are the Oybendal works in Frederiksvaerk, Raevebakken near Gilleleje and Vinderød water works. In Vinderød's water, a concentration of 98 milligrams of nitrates was found per liter of water.

Nitrates produce both short-term and long-term harmful effects. In the short term they are especially dangerous for infants, who can turn blue and have breathing difficulties because nitrates block the blood's ability to transport oxygen through the body. Long-term harmful effects can occur because nitrates can be turned into nitrites in the human body. It is known from animal studies that nitrites can be carcinogenic. This involves stomach cancer in particular.

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'UNSUITABILITY' OF POLISH FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT NOTED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 29 Jul 83 pp 1,12

[Text] Hell established its headquarters in Karpathos and is devastating the forests of the island. The fire that has been raging for three days now has charred more than 26,000 stremmas of forests.

Another 8,000 stremmas became charcoal at the triangle formed by Malesina, Martino, and Larymni before the fire was brought under control yesterday noon, while the Polish "firefighting" planes remained "on alert" in Athens. And 4,000 stremmas were burned in Arkhaia Kameiro of Rhodes, while yesterday at 2:30 pm a new large fire broke out in Zakynthos.

But the Polish planes that were "rented" by the government of "change" avoid fires! Specifically, during the two large fires in Malayasa and the triangle formed by Malesina, Martino, and Larymni, the entire burden of putting out the fire fell upon the Canadian firefighting planes, the known two engine "Canadaair" that have been used for years.

Of the eight Polish one engine P21s, only two have been used only for spraying with a chemical for fire retardation that was invented by a chemist of the Ministry of Agriculture and that was tested yesterday for the first time in fighting the fires in Malesina and Karpathos.

Are the Pilots in Danger?

Regarding the Polish one engine P21s, an authorized source of the military air force emphasized that they present many problems and cannot offer substantial help in putting out fires. Specifically:

1. They cannot lift 2 1/2 tons of water as indicated in their specifications. They can only lift 1,500 kilograms!
2. When temperatures are high, as they are now, they need a landing strip that is twice as long to take off!
3. There is a problem regarding the security of their pilots, especially in cases where they are compelled to approach sudden mountain slopes: A single irregularity in their single engine, a "stall", would be fatal.

Proof of the unsuitability of the P2ls is the fact that during the latest fires, only two of them were used out of eight and even those were removed later.

The same circles of the air force emphasized that the price and the method of payment for the Polish planes is not the factor that should burden the government and force it to buy the planes. These planes are absolutely suitable for agricultural work (fertilization, spraying, etc.), but not for putting out fires in our country under its particular topographical features.

The same circles pointed out that the proper authorities in the ministries of National Economy and Agriculture should re-examine the issue.

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